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ABSTRACT
THEORY OF MIND, SOCIAL FUNCTIONING, AND AWARENESS OF ABILITY IN
OLDER ADULTS
Sarah Vedrody Rowe
December 16, 2011
Declines in social resources and in the quality of interpersonal interactions have
been observed in some older adults. Unawareness of ability is a clinical problem that has
been found in some older adults with dementia, but has also been found in nondemented
older adults, and the clinical correlates have not been reliably established. Theory of
mind (ToM) is a social-cognitive construct that refers to the ability to infer the mental
states of others and the self. ToM has been linked with social functioning and selfawareness, but few studies have examined these variables in older adults. The current
study tested the hypotheses that lower levels of ToM ability would predict lower levels of
social functioning and higher levels of unawareness of ability.
Seventy-eight community dwelling older adults and their informants participated.
Participants completed multiple measures of ToM, memory, executive functioning, social
resources, social behaviors, and awareness of ability on different tasks. Correlations, t
tests, chi-square and path analysis were used to test the hypotheses. Study results
indicated the presence of impaired performance on ToM measures in the communitydwelling sample, but relatively accurate awareness and strong social functioning across
measures. Despite the presence of impaired performance on ToM, ToM did not predict
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any of the social relations variables. The results of the ToM and awareness analyses were
mixed, with one association that approached significance in the predicted direction and
other significant associations that were in the opposite direction.
The results suggest that ToM may not be a valid construct for predicting social
functioning in community-dwelling older adults. ToM may have been confounded with
general cognitive processes, indicating that the demonstrated impairment was not ToMspecific. An underlying neurological process also may have been detected by the ToM
tests that has not yet impacted social relations or awareness. Improvement in the
measurement of the three constructs, continued research into the correlates of awareness
and social relations, and longitudinal study in community-dwelling older adults, will help
clarify the relationship, if any, between the three constructs.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present study was to explore the relationships between theory
of mind (ToM), social relations in older adults, and the clinical problem of lack of
awareness of performance deficits in dementia and mild cognitive impairment.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that theory of mind measures may be useful in
predicting problematic social relations in older adults as well as a lack of awareness of
cognitive and behavioral deficits associated with dementing disorders. In order to
establish the basis for positing links between these three constructs, relevant background
information on each construct and its importance to successful aging will be discussed in
the following sections. The last section of the introduction will introduce hypotheses
generated from the literature review.

Social Relations
Social resources are instrumental to successful aging, and support from others
through social interactions is theorized to provide a buffer for the stresses of daily life
(see reviews, Bath & Deeg, 2005; Cohen et aI., 2001; Antonucci, 2001). Social networks
and social support are two types of social resources (Antonucci, 2001; Barnes et aI.,
2004b). Larger social networks have been associated with better health (Berkman &
Syme, 1979) and may provide increased opportunities for social support and participation
in social activities (Berkman & Syme, 1979; Berkman et aI., 2000; Bath & Deeg, 2005;
Gurung et aI., 2003). Greater levels of social support have been associated with better

physical and mental health, lower levels of cognitive decline over time, lower levels of
frailty, lower levels of depression and suicidal ideation and decreased risk for mortality in
studies of older adults (DuPertuis et ai., 2001; Beland et ai., 2005; Barnes et ai., 2004a;
Woo et aI., 2005; Vanderhorst & McLaren, 2005; Hsu, 2007). Additionally, in older
adults with dementia, those with greater social support demonstrated reduced levels of
mortality (Orrell et aI., 2000).
Older adults tend to limit their contact to close friends and family members (Field
& Minkler, 1988), and their social networks may diminish as they allocate their resources

to these smaller networks of more intimate relationships (Field & Minkler, 1988; Lang &
Carstensen, 1994; Carstensen et aI., 1999). As a group, older adults also decrease the
frequency of their contact with their network members (Carstensen, 1992).
Socioemotional selectivity theory (SST) predicts that as individuals grow older, their
motivations for socialization with others may shift from information-seeking or
achievement-oriented goals to emotionally-rewarding goals (Lang & Carstensen, 1994).
SST proposes that the shift in motivation for socialization occurs as individuals become
increasingly aware of their limited time left to live (Lang & Carstensen, 1994). As a
result of this shift toward more emotionally-rewarding relationships, older adults
consciously and proactively select out of relationships that are less emotionally
satisfying. Similarly, the Social Convoy Model posits that individuals may change the
structure of and members in their networks, but they seek to maintain consistent levels of
social support across their lifetimes (Kahn & Antonucci, 1980). The Social Convoy
Model suggests that as individuals age they become more adept at identifying and
maximizing relationships with supportive network members and more likely to discard
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unsupportive network members, which results in smaller networks (Kahn & Antonucci,
1980).
While larger network sizes may increase opportunities to receive social support,
the subjective well-being of older adults has demonstrated greater association with the
quality of their relationships as opposed to the quantity of their relationships (Pinquart &
Sorensen, 2000). Social support is often divided between instrumental and perceived
social support. Instrumental social support reflects receipt of help from others in carrying
out daily activities or providing material resources, while perceived social support
measures individuals' subjective appraisals of how well they are supported by those
around them (Sarason et aI., 1987). The quality of relationships is typically determined
by assessments of how well older adults perceive that they are supported (Sarason et aI.,
1987). While both instrumental and perceived social support are important, perceived
social support has demonstrated the greatest ability to predict overall well-being, which
has in tum, been associated with better health outcomes (Cohen et aI., 1985; Cohen et aI.,
2001).
The subjective nature of perceived social support highlights the importance of the
quality of the interaction between individuals and members of their networks. In other
words, whether individuals perceive themselves as being supported by their network
members may depend on the types of interpersonal interactions that they have with them.
Reis, Clark and Holmes (2004) have linked perceived support with the responsiveness of
the individual providing support to the needs of the recipient. Studies examining the
frequency of positive and negative social exchanges have also emphasized the
contribution of interpersonal interactions to well-being. In a longitudinal study utilizing
daily diaries that captured the number of positive and negative social interactions that
3

older adults experienced, higher levels of negative social interactions were associated
with a lack of well-being and depression (Rook, 2001). In this study, negative social
interactions also appeared to mitigate the impact of positive interactions on mood.
Another study found that negative social exchanges seem to have longer-lasting effects
on both positive and negative affect (Newsom et ai., 2003). In yet another study, older
men who reported that the people close to them were too demanding and older women
who reported that individuals close to them were irritating, reported lower levels of
happiness (Antonucci et ai., 1998). Perceived poorer quality support has also been
associated with the decision to hasten death in terminally ill older adults (Schroepfer,
2008). Collectively, these findings emphasize the importance of the quality of the
interpersonal interaction between older adults and network members.
Individual characteristics such as depression and cognitive impairment may make
some older adults more likely to experience negative social exchanges. A large
longitudinal study found that older adults who were depressed or cognitively-impaired at
baseline reported more negative interpersonal interactions with members of their network
approximately two years later (Gurung et ai., 2003). Older adults' exposure to negative
social exchanges has also been associated with less supportive networks and greater life
stress, and decreases in exposure to negative social exchanges over time have been
associated with satisfaction with friend relationships (Rook, 2003). Notably, increases in
the exposure to negative exchanges has been associated with increases in total support
(including instrumental support) provided by the network (Rook, 2003). The positive
correlation between negative social exchanges and total support may be explained by
individuals needing increased emotional and instrumental support due to declines in
cognition or daily functioning, such as declines in basic activities of daily living (ADLs)
4

or instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). In essence, changes in function may
alter the number or content of social exchanges with network members. In such cases,
the support provided to individuals may be inadequate or may not match their support
needs. Negative social exchanges may result from this mismatch, as individuals needing
support become frustrated with their support networks and network members adapt, with
varying levels of success, their behavior to meet the needs of their loved ones.

Thus,

changes in function may increase older adults' exposure to negative social exchanges.
Increases in negative social exchanges may also b.e explained by increases in
inappropriate social behaviors displayed by some older adults. Inappropriate social
behaviors that have demonstrated greater frequencies in older adults compared to
younger adults include higher levels of off-target verbosity, discussion of private events
in public settings, and prejudicial and stereotyping behavior (Henry et aI., 2009; Pushkar
et aI., 2000; von Hippel et aI., 2000; von Hippel & Dunlop, 2005). Henry et ai. (2009)
have found that the relationship between age and social inappropriateness is mediated by
executive functioning, though this model only partially explains the variance in social
appropriateness. This finding is particularly important because executive functioning has
been linked with frontal lobe integrity, which may be linked with social functioning
(Stuss & Levine, 2002).
Additional evidence for the importance of the frontal lobes to social functioning
comes from illnesses that damage frontal lobe structures. The frontal variant
frontotemporal dementia (fvFTD), which initially affects the orbitofrontal and
ventromedial areas of the prefrontal cortex, provides an extreme example of how
dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex can affect social behavior. Patients with fvFTD
initially present with severe deficits in social functioning that include "breaches of
5

interpersonal etiquette, tactlessness, and disinhibition,"

(Snowden et aI., 2002 p. 140;

see also Neary et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 1999; Lough & Hodges, 2002; Bozeat et aI.,
2000).
In nonnal aging, cognitive functions associated with the prefrontal cortex decline
first (West, 1996; Raz & Rodrigue, 2006) and may explain changes associated with social
behavior. The end ofthe lifespan is widely recognized as a time ofloss in multiple
domains, but it is also characterized by variability in these losses across individuals.
Aging demonstrates differential effects across the brains of individuals due to diseases of
age, cardiovascular diseases, metabolic disorders, etc. (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006). While
nonnal aging may not involve the pervasive deterioration in frontal lobe integrity seen in
fvFTD, many nonnally aging individuals may experience relative loss of various frontal
functions which may, in tum, affect their social behavior (Henry et aI., 2009).
Theory of Mind
Social-cognitive constructs, such as empathy and morality, are hypothesized to be
recruited by the cognitive system for the processing of social stimuli; they enable humans
to make sense of the social world and interact productively with others (Washburn et aI.,
2003). Theory of mind (ToM) is a social-cognitive construct that may account for
variability in social functioning in older adults, particularly those in the early stages of
dementia. ToM concerns the ability to attribute mental states to the self and others in
order to explain and predict behavior (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Frith & Frith, 1999).
ToM involves an awareness that others may have thoughts, beliefs, emotions, or
intentions that are different from one's own (Frith & Frith, 1999). Knowledge of others'
mental states can be used to effectively adapt one's own behavior to achieve desired
outcomes. ToM, or the ability to "mentalize" or "mind-read," has been associated with
6

evolutionary advantages, as mind-reading abilities would allow human beings to better
adapt to social complexities (Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006). ToM reliably emerges in
healthy children across different cultures around the age of four and develops throughout
childhood, and ToM may represent an important resource for social relations (Perner &
Wimmer, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Liu et aI., 2008).
A premise of social cognitive measures is that such measures should be able to
explain social functioning better than nonsocial cognitive measures, such as those used in
typical assessment batteries. ToM has been implicated in social functioning through
studies with clinical populations that have marked social deficits. Individuals with
autism, Asperger's syndrome, schizophrenia, traumatic brain injury, and dementia have
all demonstrated deficits on tests of ToM (Baron-Cohen et at, 2001; Baron-Cohen et at,
1985; Brune, 2005; Langdon et at, 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007; Gregory et aI., 2002;
Happe et aI., 1998; Happe, 1994; Milders et aI., 2006). ToM abilities also predict social
functioning in childhood, as children with ToM are more likely to initiate play and assign
roles for pretend play than children without ToM (Astington & Jenkins, 1995). There
have only been two studies that examined the direct relationship between ToM and social
relations in older adults. While one study found that nurses ratings' of nursing home
residents' social functioning were predicted by their performance on a ToM task
(Washburn, 2003), the other study found no relationship between ToM and pro social
behaviors in healthy older adults living in the community (Washburn et at, 2003; Bailey
et at, 2008).
Measures of ToM have demonstrated utility over traditional neuropsychological
tests in differentiating individuals in the early stages of fvFTD from healthy older adults
and from patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD; Gregory et at, 2002; Torralva et at,
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2009). Patients with fvFTD may not initially demonstrate deficits on traditional
neuropsychological tests, and imaging procedures may provide little assistance in
diagnosing fvFTD in the initial stages (Gregory et aI., 2002; Neary et aI., 1998; Lough &
Hodges, 2002; Bozeat et aI., 2000; Gregory et aI., 1999). Thus, the development and
utilization of ToM measures could have considerable value in dementia assessment, and
possibly in pre-dementia states.
Lesion and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have primarily
associated ToM with the prefrontal cortex, particularly the orbitofrontal and ventromedial
areas, though other areas of prefrontal cortex, the limbic system, and the temporo-parietal
junction appear to be important in carrying out ToM tasks as well (Gregory, 2002;
Gallagher et aI., 2000; Rowe et aI., 2001; Baird et aI., 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Stone
et aI., 2003; Stuss et aI., 2001). Individuals with damage to these areas often demonstrate
impairments on ToM tasks compared to healthy controls and display deficits in social
functioning that include disruptive behaviors. For example, patients with orbitofrontal
lobe lesions and patients with fvFTD have demonstrated significantly poorer performance
compared to healthy controls in detecting social faux pas (Gregory et aI., 2002; Stone et
aI., 1998). Additionally, ToM performance was significantly related to the amount of
atrophy in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in patients with fvFTD, with individuals
who had greater atrophy displaying poorer performance on ToM tasks (Gregory et aI.,
2002).
ToM Measures

Based on empirical evidence from clinical populations with developmental
disabilities, Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (2000) have suggested that ToM has two
components: a social-cognitive component and a social-perceptual component. The
8

social-perceptual component is hypothesized to be linked to the affective system and
involves the processing of the social expressions of others, including their gestures, facial
expressions, and vocal tone. The social-perceptual component of ToM is important for
making rapid online judgments about others' mental states.

The social-cognitive

component involves the representational aspect of ToM and likely relies on both social
and nonsocial cognitive processes; relevant nonsocial cognitive processes include
language ability and working memory. While some ToM tests may emphasize the socialperceptual component more than the social-cognitive component, the social-cognitive
component is still necessary to perform well on social-perceptual ToM tasks due to the
language or working memory demands on those tasks.

Likewise, the social-cognitive

component may be influenced by information gathered by the social-perceptual
component. Developmentally, both components are theorized to continue developing
throughout childhood (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).
In children, tasks that measure the ability to comprehend false beliefs are the gold
standard for assessing the social-cognitive component of ToM (Tager-Flusberg &
Sullivan, 2000). Such ToM tasks are often embedded within a series of questions about
a vignette. Vignettes, as well as non-verbal stimuli such as cartoons, are frequently used
to test false beliefs, as well as the ability to infer the emotions, motivations, or intentions
of the characters depicted in them. There are essentially two main kinds of false belief
tasks: first-order false belief tasks and second-order false belief tasks. A first-order false
belief task measures the ability to detect when someone has a belief that is different from
one's own (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). An example of a first-order task involves
presenting participants with a scenario such as, "Mary put a glass of water on the kitchen
table and then she left the kitchen; after she left, John moved the glass of water to the
9

sink" (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983).

The ToM question in this example would be "Where

does Mary think the water is?" At approximately the age of four, children pass first-order
false belief tasks by correctly stating a character's false belief. However, normally
developing children below the age of four usually respond that the glass is where they
(the children being tested) believe it to be in reality (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983).
Participants are also asked questions to ascertain their factual understanding of the story,
such as, "Where is the glass of water?" They are also asked questions testing their
memory of the story content. The aim of these questions is to control for possible
confounds and increase the specificity ofthe task for identifying ToM abilities.
Second-order false belief tasks involve the ability to metarepresent the mental
states of two people (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985). Second-order false belief tasks present
participants with a scenario similar to the first-order false belief task, but the scenario is
modified. For example, the same scenario from the first-order false belief task could be
used with the following addition: "Mary peeks back into the kitchen to see John move the
glass without John noticing that Mary is spying on him" (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985). The
second-order ToM question for this scenario would be, "Where does John think that Mary
thinks the glass is?" Children would not typically give the correct answer that John
thinks that Mary thinks the glass is on the table until at least the age of seven (Pemer &
Wimmer, 1985).
The usefulness of false belief tasks (as described above) as a measure of ToM
ability in older adults may be limited. First-order false belief tasks are often too easy for
older adults, even those with Alzheimer's disease; the results of studies that have used
first-order false belief tasks with older adults tend to demonstrate ceiling effects (Zaitchik
et aI., 2004; Zaitchik et aI., 2006). Second-order false belieftasks rely heavily on
10

working memory, which often declines with age (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007).
Finally, some high-functioning patients in clinical populations who display social deficits
have been able to pass traditional false belief tasks, indicating that false belief tasks may
not be as sensitive to subtle deficits in social functioning (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1997;
Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999; Happe, 1994).
Advanced tests of ToM have been developed for adults and patients in clinical
populations who can pass the false belief tasks described above but who still demonstrate
social deficits compared to healthy controls (Gregory et aI., 2002; Baron-Cohen et aI.,
1999). Advanced ToM tests attempt to replicate the complexity of naturally occurring
social situations in which ToM abilities must be employed. Two such tests are the Faux
Pas Test and the Reading the Eyes in the Mind test (EYES; Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999;
Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001; Stone et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 2002). For the Faux Pas
Test, individuals are presented with vignettes in which a faux pas mayor may not have
occurred. The test requires individuals to correctly detect when a faux pas has occurred,
and it also assesses faux pas understanding. To succeed, older adults must metarepresent
two mental states: the mental state of the character committing the faux pas and the
mental state of the person who may be disturbed by the faux pas (Stone et aI., 1998).
While the Faux Pas Test requires cultural knowledge, it also requires both affective and
cognitive elements of ToM (Stone et aI., 1998). Although older adults are read the
vignette by an examiner, working memory demands are reduced because older adults are
allowed to refer to a written copy of the vignette as they answer questions (Gregory et aI.,
2002). With regard to clinical populations, the Faux Pas Test demonstrated the greatest
sensitivity in detecting patients with fvFTD compared to other tests of ToM, and it has
also demonstrated greater sensitivity than false belief tasks in detecting Asperger's
11

syndrome (Gregory et ai., 2002; Baron-Cohen et ai., 1999). Thus, the Faux Pas Test
appears to be an advanced ToM measure that is extremely sensitive to deficits in social
functioning in adults.
EYES is a measure of higher-order ToM ability that was designed to tap the
social-perceptual component of ToM (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1997; Baron-Cohen et ai.,
2001; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). It requires individuals to discern complex
mental states just by viewing a picture of a pair of human eyes (Tager-Flusberg &
Sullivan, 2000; Baron-Cohen et ai., 1997; Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001; Stone et ai., 1998).
Participants are shown a picture of the eyes surrounded by four mental state words (i.e.
grateful, bored, aghast, etc.) and instructed to choose "the word that best describes what
the person in the picture is thinking or feeling" (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001). Like the
Faux Pas Test, EYES demonstrates age differentiation in children and has successfully
differentiated patients with Asperger's syndrome and fvFTD from healthy controls
(Baron-Cohen et ai., 2001; Gregory et ai., 2002). Scores on EYES are also normally
distributed among healthy controls, making it an excellent measure of ToM ability in
older adults.
While both EYES and the Faux Pas test are considered advanced ToM tests, they
do not always correlate with one another. In patients with fvFTD, performance on EYES
and the Faux Pas Test were significantly correlated in one study (Torralva et aI., 2007).
In another study comparing patients with AD, fvFTD, and healthy controls, significant

correlations were found between first-order false belief tasks, second-order false belief
tasks, and the Faux Pas Test, although none of these measures correlated with EYES
(Gregory et ai., 2002). Explanations for the lack of correlation between different ToM
measures in some samples have included hypotheses that the tests were measuring
12

different aspects of ToM (i.e. social-cognitive vs. social-perceptual; visual vs. verbal;
affective vs. cognitive) or findings that variance in some ToM tasks may be better
explained by other cognitive processes (Gregory et aI., 2002; Saltzman et aI., 2000;
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000; Shamay-Tsoory & Haron-Peretz, 2007).
Variability in performance accounted for by other cognitive processes is at the
root of a debate regarding the existence of a dedicated ToM module because ToM
abilities have been associated with language, attention, memory, and executive
functioning; these cognitive abilities are believed to contribute to performance on ToM
tasks, but may not fully explain ToM abilities (Milligan et aI., 2007). Evidence for the
modularity of ToM has been found in studies demonstrating dissociations from other
cognitive processes as well as studies in which ToM performance significantly
distinguishes groups even after controlling for associated cognitive processes (Rowe et
aI., 2001; Lough et aI., 2006). Because aging is characterized by average declines in a
range of cognitive processes; including perceptual speed, spatial orientation, and verbal
memory; deficits in cognitive processes could explain any deficits that older adults
exhibit on ToM measures (Schaie, 1994). As the declines in cognitive functioning seen
in patients with dementia are even more profound, studies of ToM in patients with
dementia must control for associated cognitive processes in order to determine whether
an individual has a specific impairment regarding inferring the mental states of others.
For example, an individual in the mild stages of dementia may have great difficulty
recalling a vignette and answering questions about it not because of a ToM deficit, but
because of a working memory deficit. Control conditions and controlling for
confounding variables within analyses are ways that researchers have attempted to isolate
ToM performance in older adult samples. The loss of supportive general cognitive
13

processes with age may make some tests of ToM less specific for ToM deficits in older
adults if damaged general cognitive processes are recruited during task performance.
Additionally, the loss of general cognitive processes also may contribute to deficits in
social functioning (Henry et aI., 2009). For example, if an individual with dementia has
deficits in working memory, the individual may have difficulty following the flow of a
conversation. With these issues in mind, studies examining whether ToM abilities
decline in healthy older adults will be reviewed.
ToM and Healthy Aging
The first study of ToM in older adults was in 1998 (Happe et aI., 1998). Since
that time, there have been 16 studies that have examined the performance of older adults
on ToM tests in comparison to younger adults. These studies, their findings, and their
limitations are outlined in Table 1. The first study, by Happe et aI. (1998), indicated that
older adults have superior ToM abilities in comparison to younger adults, which was a
very exciting finding when compared to the other cognitive losses that characterize the
aging process (Schaie, 1994). However, the sample of older adults had a higher mean
education level than the mean of the population within their age group, leading the
authors to speculate that their superior performance on ToM may have been related to
higher intelligence rather than age. Unfortunately, no measures of potentially
confounding cognitive variables; such as intelligence, executive functioning, or memory;
were collected.
Results of the 15 studies since then have been mixed, but they have failed to
replicate Happe et aI. 's results (1998). Subsequent studies have indicated that ToM
abilities are either preserved or decline in older adults. Twelve of these studies have
demonstrated a main effect of age on overall task performance on at least one ToM
14

measure, although the use of control conditions and covariates have enabled researchers
to attribute some age effects to declines in other cognitive processes rather than a decline
specifically related to ToM (Saltzman et aI., 2000; Maylor et aI., 2002; Phillips et aI.,
2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; German & Hehman, 2006; Wang & Su, 2006;
Uekermann et aI., 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey
et aI., 2008; Pardini & Nichelli, 2009). Some studies have found that lower ToM ability
in older adults compared to younger adults can be accounted for by declines in general
cognitive processes such as working memory or executive functioning, rather than ToMspecific declines (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Saltzman et aI., 2000; German & Hehman,
2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007).

Other studies have not been able to account for

ToM-specific differences with general cognitive processes; they have found evidence of
ToM-specific impairment with age on some tasks (Phillips et aI., 2002; Wang & Su,
2006; Uekermann et aI., 2006; Slessor et aI., 2007; Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey et aI.,
2008). Including 3 studies that have had mixed results across different ToM measures, 9
studies have found evidence suggesting that ToM-specific ability is relatively preserved
with age (Saltzman et aI., 2000; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; MacPherson et aI., 2002;
German & Hehman, 2006; Wang & Su, 2006; Keightley et aI., 2006; McKinnon &
Moscovitch, 2007; Slessor et aI., 2007; Verdon et aI., 2007), while 9 studies have found
evidence suggesting that ToM may decline with age (Saltzman et aI., 2000; Maylor et aI.,
2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004; Phillips et aI., 2002; Wang & Su, 2006; Uekermann et
aI., 2006; Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey et aI., 2008; Pardini & Nichelli, 2009). These
mixed findings may be explained by differences in the ToM and general cognitive tasks
employed across studies, as well as varying levels of ToM ability within samples. Only
one study (Bailey, 2008) has explored the relevance oflower ToM abilities in
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community-dwelling older adults with regard to their daily lives (Bailey et aI., 2008).
While that study found that older adults performed worse than younger adults on EYES
and had lower levels of social participation compared to younger adults, performance on
EYES was not a significant mediator between age and participation in social activities
(Bailey et aI., 2008). However, cognitive empathy, as measured by a self-report
inventory, was found to mediate the relationship between age and participation in social
activities, providing some evidence that the ability to take the perspective of another has
some bearing on social behavior in older adults (Bailey et aI., 2008).

Impaired Awareness
Impaired self-awareness has been defined as an inadequate assessment of one's
abilities, a lack of understanding of the consequences of carrying out behaviors exceeding
the limits of one's ability, failure to use information to change one's personal awareness
of deficits, and problems making decisions that relate past selves to current or future
selves (Stuss, 1991; Clare, 2004b). Notably, the terms impaired awareness, lack of
insight, and anosognosia are used throughout the literature to refer to a lack of knowledge
of one's cognitive and social deficits, and these terms will be used interchangeably in this
paper. Impaired self-awareness places older adults at significant social and physical risk
as they may not employ sufficient compensation to carry out tasks that they attempt, or
they may choose to carry out tasks that they do not have the cognitive or physical
resources to safely attempt even with the use of compensatory aids.

Lack of awareness

into behavioral and social deficits is such a common feature of frontotemporal dementia
that it is part of the diagnostic criteria (Neary et at, 1998). Lack of awareness of
cognitive deficits has also been noted in patients with AD. In one study of patients
diagnosed with probable AD, approximately 54% of the sample was classified as
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unaware of their cognitive deficits (Auchus et aI., 1994). Lack of awareness of deficits
in independent living skills and memory ability have also been positively associated with
caregiver burden, suggesting that lack of awareness may directly impact interpersonal
relationships (Seltzer et aI., 1997; DeBettignies et aI., 1990). Additionally, individuals
with dementia who lack awareness of their deficits have also demonstrated higher levels
of neuropsychiatric disturbance, which has also been shown to increase caregiver burden
(Mangone et aI., 1991; Rymer et aI., 2002). Clearly impaired awareness represents a
clinical problem that is present in some, but not all, individuals with dementia.
Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) typically indicates impaired memory in the
absence of other symptoms of dementia (Petersen et aI., 2001). Patients who have been
diagnosed with MCI appear to be at greater risk for conversion to dementia of the
Alzheimer's type compared to older adults without MCI (Morris & Cummings, 2005).
One study found that 31.1 % of patients diagnosed with Mild Cognitive Impairment
(MCI) demonstrated a lack of awareness with regard to their ability to manage bank
statements whereas only 5.6% of older adults without MCI demonstrated lack of
awareness of their ability for that task (Okonkwo et aI., 2008). The same study found
that patients with MCI significantly overestimated their financial abilities in other areas
as well. Impaired self-awareness, however, is not restricted to individuals diagnosed with
cognitive impairment. For example, in a study of patients with AD and normally aging
individuals, 31 % of the normally aging individuals gave better assessments of their
performance after completing cognitive tasks than their performances actually warranted
(Graham et aI., 2005). These results suggest that impaired awareness may be present in
community-dwelling older adults without a formal diagnosis of dementia and that
impaired awareness increases the vulnerability of older adults in vital domains.
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Studies have revealed contradictory findings regarding the clinical correlates of
impaired awareness in dementia, making impaired awareness difficult to predict (see
reviews, Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare, 2004a). Neither demographics nor
neuropsychological measures are particularly helpful in predicting awareness deficits
(Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare, 2004a). Furthermore, while some studies have found
significant positive associations between dementia severity and impaired awareness
(Mangone et aI., 1991; McDaniel et aI., 1995), other studies have not (Michon et aI.,
1994; Auchus et aI., 1994). Between AD and fvFTD and even across individuals with the
same dementia diagnosis, there appears to be variability in the presence, severity, and
domain (social, behavioral, cognitive, IADLs, etc.) of impaired awareness (Smith et aI.,
2000; Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare et aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a; Clare, 2004b; Evers et aI.,
2007). Additionally, there is intraindividual variability in awareness, in which an
individual may be aware of some deficits, but not others.
One reason for this variability may reside in the different methods used to
measure the construct of awareness. In general, there are five ways in which awareness
has been assessed in dementia (see reviews Clare, 2004a; Clare et aI., 2005b). Some
studies have assessed awareness by using clinician ratings. Other studies have compared
patients' ratings of their ability in different domains, such as memory and ADLs, with
informants' ratings of patients' abilities in those domains. A third way that awareness
has been assessed is by comparing patients' ratings of their performance on cognitive
tasks with their actual performance on those tasks. Phenomenological methods have also
been used to explore different aspects of awareness. Finally, some studies have
employed a combination of the above methods (Clare et aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a). All of
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these methods have been found to be limited in their ability to assess awareness (Clare et
aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a).
A second reason for the variability seen in awareness may be related to the
conceptual complexities inherent in the construct of awareness. Specifically, impaired
awareness is determined through social processes that involve a patient's self-report.
Clare has presented a biopsychosocial model of awareness that highlights the difficulties
in concluding that individuals are unaware of problems based on what they say or do
(Clare, 2003; Clare, 2002). In this model, self-awareness is made possible by the
neurological structure of the brain and the integrity of supportive cognitive processes.
Defensive denial is a psychological process that can result in behaviors that appear to
outside observers to indicate a lack of awareness of a problem. Defensive denial is not
specific to dementia, however, and may be seen across all illnesses. Thus individuals
may have difficulty accepting their problems and may deny that they have problems
when asked about them, making them appear unaware of their deficits. In support of this,
studies have found that patients with dementia who were more aware of their deficits also
tended to be dysthymic or had subsyndromal depression, whereas patients categorized as
unaware were less likely to have symptoms of depression (see review, Aalten et aI.,
2005). Thus, unawareness at the psychological level could protect the individual from
depression. The social reasons that individuals may deny their deficits even if they are
aware of them include the desire to present themselves well to practitioners as well as
recognition oflimitations that could be placed on their activities (such as driving) if they
admit that there is a problem.
ToM appears to be closely related to self-awareness, and disruptions in ToM
ability may explain impaired awareness in dementing disorders, particularly with regard
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to the biological and cognitive aspects of Clare's model. Evidence for the close
relationship between ToM and self-awareness comes from the child development and
brain imaging literatures. First, ToM ability includes the ability to attribute mental states
to the self as well as to others, and self-awareness involves the ability to metarepresent
the self. Second, the abilities to attribute mental states to the self and to others appear to
emerge in children simultaneously, suggesting that ToM is required in order to make
mental representations about the selfthat allow for consciousness ofthe self (Gopnik &
Meltzoff, 1994; Happe, 2003). Based on their work with patients who have brain lesions
and functional neuroimaging, Stuss and Anderson (Stuss & Anderson, 2004) have related
both ToM and self-awareness to the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex. This overlap in
the ventromedial areas of the prefrontal cortex may explain why individuals with fvFTD
tend to demonstrate poor performance on ToM tasks and tend to exhibit impaired
awareness into their behavioral and social deficits. However, although both selfawareness and ToM may share key neural circuitry, they appear to be dissociable
constructs. Imaging studies utilizing fMRI that have compared self-awareness and ToM
have found that the two constructs rely on overlapping yet distinct neural substrates (Saxe
et aI., 2006; Vogeley et aI., 2001). Experimental research using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) also found that stimulation of the right prefrontal cortex disrupted
individuals' self-perspectives, but not their ability to infer others' mental states (Guise et
aI., 2007). While self-awareness and ToM may be dissociable, ToM deficits may predict
impaired self-awareness, as deficits on ToM tasks may indicate an inability to adequately
process social information about the self that is needed to update self-schemas.
Additionally, deficits on ToM tasks may reflect damage to neural circuitry that is also
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needed for self-awareness. Thus, ToM tests may have clinical value in identifying and
predicting individuals who may have or who will have deficits in self-awareness.
To date, there have been two studies of ToM and awareness in relation to
dementia (Cuerva et aI., 2001; Caoile, 2002). Both studies compared patients diagnosed
with AD to healthy controls. Both studies also defined awareness as the discrepancy
between informant and participant responses on a single measure of insight. While one
study found no relationship between ToM and awareness (Cuerva et aI., 2001), the other
study found a significant negative relationship (r2

=

0.42) between awareness of deficits

and ToM performance across all participants but not within each group (Caoile, 2002).
The study that found no relationship between ToM and awareness used a ToM task that
has been shown to make significant demands on working memory, which was not
controlled for in the study (Cuerva et aI., 2001). The findings of the second study suggest
that general cognitive ability may explain the relationship between ToM and awareness in
that study, although the authors did not specifically investigate this. Other studies have
also found no association between awareness deficits and cognitive ability in dementia
(see review, Aalten et aI., 2005). Importantly, in the studies that have explored ToM and
awareness in dementia, the use of only one type of measure of awareness may not have
adequately represented the construct of awareness and neither patient nor informant
depression, which have been found to influence response style, were controlled for in the
analyses. The proposed study attempted to address these limitations in order to clarify
the relationship, if any, between impaired awareness and ToM.
The differential effects of aging on the brains of older adults, however, suggest
that damage to brain areas important for both ToM and awareness may be present in
older adults with and without dementia. As noted in the paragraphs above, supposedly
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healthy community-dwelling older adults may demonstrate impaired awareness while
some individuals with dementia do not. This variability may be explained by individual
differences in the integrity of underlying brain systems, but knowledge of the clinical
correlates of unawareness is limited. Efforts to increase knowledge of the clinical
correlates of unawareness may be helpful for identifying older adults in need of
assistance. Individual differences in ToM ability may relate to the problem of
unawareness of ability level found in community-dwelling older adults with and without
dementia and may explain the variability that has been found in previous studies. There
are other reasons for exploring the relationship between ToM and awareness in a
community sample. First, community-dwelling older adults are likely at greater risk of
harm when they do not have a good understanding of their abilities compared to older
adults living in institutional settings. Second, while cognitively intact older adults may
demonstrate impaired awareness of their ability, problems with insight into ability level
may also indicate dementia onset. Prevalence estimates for undiagnosed dementia in
community-dwelling older adults have been estimated to be more than 50% (Boustani et
aI.,2003). One reason for the high prevalence rate of undetected dementia in
community-dwelling older adults could be related to a lack of awareness of a change in
ability. In other words, individuals would be unlikely to contact their physician when
they are not aware of any significant changes. Iflower levels of ToM ability are related
to problems with awareness, then ToM tests could be a useful tool for identifying older
adults whose general safety may be at risk as well as older adults in the early stages of
dementia. Thus, the proposed study explored the relationship between ToM and
awareness in community-dwelling older adults, including individuals with dementia,
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because it was hypothesized that ToM represents an important clinical correlate of
impaired awareness.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
The current study addressed the following research questions:
1.

Does ToM ability predict social resources and social behavior of older adults
living in the community? In order to answer this question, the correlates of ToM
were explored in relation to social networks, perceived social support, and
interpersonal behavior. Specifically, it was hypothesized that older adults with
lower levels of ToM ability would have smaller social networks, report lower
levels of perceived social support, and would exhibit greater disturbance in
interpersonal exchanges. With respect to social networks, the hypothesis was
based on some evidence that healthy older adults demonstrate worse performance
on advanced ToM tests compared to younger adults and the parallel phenomena
of decreasing network sizes with increasing age. The relationship of ToM and
problems in interpersonal relations was based on findings from research with
ToM and clinical populations, particularly patients with fvFTD, that demonstrate
problematic interpersonal behavior. Although social support may be relatively
steady throughout the lifespan (according to the Convoy Model), it was
hypothesized that deficits in ToM ability would preclude older adults from
successfully interacting with others in a manner that would get them the support
they need. Finally, it was hypothesized that ToM would contribute to the
variance in these social variables even after controlling for associated
demographics, health, and cognitive variables. A model of the primary
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hypotheses related to the social variables and ToM is presented in Figure 1 in the
appendix.
2. How does ToM ability relate to awareness of cognitive and social ability? It was
hypothesized that individuals who demonstrate lower levels of performance on
ToM tests would also demonstrate higher levels of awareness difficulties. Further
it was hypothesized that ToM would independently predict awareness difficulties
even after controlling for associated variables. A model depicting the primary
hypotheses related to awareness is depicted in Figure 2 in the appendix.
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METHODS

Sample
Eighty one participants were recruited for approximately one year from a variety
of sources in the community, including advertisements and contacts with senior centers,
churches, and physicians. To be included in the study, individuals had to be at least 60
years of age, reside within the community, and have an informant who knew them well
and who was willing to participate in the study'. Older adults in the severe stages of
dementia, who demonstrated evidence of psychosis (as observed by the clinician or
researcher), or who had significant hearing and vision deficits (as measured by Snellen
Eye Chart) were excluded from the study. Of the 81 participants who consented to
participate, three were excluded from data analyses for the following reasons: two
individuals met criteria for impaired vision (WHO, 1993) and one individual dropped out
before completing most study measures due to difficulties understanding the English
language.
An informant for one primary participant also refused to consent to participation.
The primary participant was allowed to continue participating as she had consented to
participate and also listed alternative informants that would likely participate in the place
ofthe informant who had refused. However, the alternative informants did not choose to
participate. Thus, this primary participant's data is included in analyses that do not
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require informant data. In sum, the final data set for statistical analyses included 78
primary participants and 77 informants.
Measures
Background Variables
Sociodemographic information for participants and informants were collected
through self-report, and included age, gender, ethnicity/race, education, employment
information, household income, marital status, the relationship of the participant to the
ipformant, the length of time that the informant has known the participant, and how often
the informant spent time with the participant.
Health
Charlson Comorbidity Index (CMf)
The self-report version of the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CMI) is a checklist of
chronic diseases, and each disease contributing to the index is weighted according to risk
for mortality (Charlson et aI., 1987). The CMI has significantly predicted one-year
survival in medical patients (Charlson et aI., 1987) and recovery in the ability to carry out
activities of daily living (ADL) in patients engaging in medical rehabilitation (Moore &
Lichtenberg, 1996). CMI medical conditions include myocardial infarct, congestive
heart failure, peripheral vascular disease, cerebrovascular disease, dementia, chronic
pulmonary disease, connective tissue disease, ulcer disease, mild liver disease, diabetes,
hemiplegia, moderate or severe renal disease, diabetes with end organ damage, any
tumor, leukemia, lymphoma, moderate or severe liver disease, metastatic solid tumor, and
AIDS.
Vascular Risk
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Items taken from the Probability of Stroke Risk Profile were used to calculate a
composite score for vascular risk. Probability of Stroke Risk Profile items included:
current cigarette smoking, history of cardiovascular disease, history of atrial fibrillation,
left ventricular hypertrophy, history of high blood pressure or treatment for hypertension,
and history of diabetes (Wolf et aI., 1991). A weighted score may be calculated using
specific medical data, such as actual systolic blood pressure. As the current study utilizes
a self-report format, a composite score for vascular risk was calculated by summing these
variables, yielding a range of 0-6 for the vascular risk composite score. Summed scores
for vascular risk factors have been used in previous studies that used a self-report format
(Yochim, Mast, & Lichtenberg, 2003; Holley & Mast, 2007).
Self-Rated Health
Perceived health status was measured by asking participants: "In general, would
you say your health is .... (circle one) Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair or Poor."
Multiple studies in the gerontology literature have demonstrated this item's relation to
mortality and other health outcomes (see review, Idler & Benyamini, 1997).
Screening Measure for Parkinson's disease
This measure is essentially a check list of symptoms that have been associated
with Parkinson's disease (PD) in research studies. Participants either screen positive or
negative for PD.
Depression
Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS)
The Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) is a self-report measure consisting of30
statements reflecting depressive symptoms that older adults frequently report (Brink,
1982). The response format is dichotomized; participants simply answer "yes" or "no" in
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order to indicate their agreement with each item. The 30-item version of the GDS has
demonstrated excellent internal consistency with a Cronbach's a of .94 and excellent
reliability (split-half = .94; (Yesavage et aI., 1982). Sheikh & Yesavage (Sheikh &
Yesavage, 1986) developed a 15-item short form that is highly correlated with the
original30-item version (r = .84) and was used in this study to assess both participant and
informant depressive symptoms. A cut-score of 5 has been recommended for classifying
individuals as depressed versus non-depressed (Hermann et aI., 1996).
Cognitive Variables

North American Adult Reading Test (NAART)
The North American Adult Reading Test (NAART) was used to provide an
estimate of premorbid IQ. For the NAART, participants read aloud 61 irregularly
pronounced words, and their score is based on the number of words they correctly
pronounce. The NAART has demonstrated excellent reliability as estimated by a
Cronbach's a of .93 in one sample (Uttl, 2002). Correlations with the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) and the NAART were .75 for the Full Scale IQ,
.83 for Verbal IQ, and .40 for Performance IQ (Blair & Spreen, 1989).

Dementia Rating Scale - Version 2 (DRS-2)
The Dementia Rating Scale - 2 (DRS-2) is a measure of global cognitive
functioning that has demonstrated utility in detecting dementia (Jurica et aI., 2001). In
addition to a score for overall cognitive functioning, the DRS-2 has subscales for
attention, initiationiperseveration, conceptualization, construction, and memory abilities.
One-week test-retest reliability for the DRS-2 total score was .97 while the subscales testretest reliabilities ranged from .61 to .94. The DRS-2 has acceptable levels of convergent
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and divergent validity with other neuropsychological tests commonly used in assessing
individuals for dementia.
Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB)
The Frontal Assessment Battery (F AB) is a brief, valid measure of frontal lobe
functions (Dubois et aI., 2000). The FAB includes items that measure inhibitory control,
motor series programming, verbal fluency, autonomy with regard to environmental cues,
sensitivity to interference, and abstract reasoning. Participants are asked to carry out
tasks such as naming all of the words that they can think of that begin with a specific
letter and demonstrating a sequence of hand gestures. The FAB has good internal
consistency (Cronbach's a = .78) and discriminant validity (correctly categorized 89.1 %
of cases in a sample including healthy controls and patients with frontal lobe dysfunction;
Dubois et aI., 2000).
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test- Revised (HVLT-R)
The Hopkins Verbal Learning Test is a widely used neuropsychological test of
verbal learning and memory with established normative data, reliability, and validity
(Brandt & Benedict, 2001). Participants are read a list of 12 words. After the examiner
has read the entire list, participants are asked to say the words that they remember. The
process is repeated over two more trials. Then is a time delay of 20-25 minutes, at the
end of which participant long-term recall is assessed by free recall and recognition tasks.
Letter-Number Sequencing (LN-Seq)
Letter-number sequencing (LN-Seq) is a subtest from the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale - Version III that measures working memory (Wechsler, 1997;
Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2006; Lezak et aI., 2004). In the LN-Seq subtest,
progressively longer sequences of letters interspersed with numbers are orally presented
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to participants. After hearing the letter-number sequence, participants must mentally
reorganize the numbers and letters in the sequence and then orally present all the numbers
in ascending order followed by all of the letters in alphabetical order.
Social Relations Measures
Convoy Measure
The size of participants' affective networks was measured using the hierarchical
mapping technique described by Antonucci (Antonucci, 1986). Participants are given a
diagram with three concentric circles. The word "You" is written in the center of the
three circles. Participants are told, "this is you in the middle" (Kahn & Antonucci, 1980).
Participants are instructed to think of "people who are important in your life right now"
and write each person's initials into the circle that best represents how close they feel to
that person (Antonucci, 1986). Participants are told to place "those people to whom you
feel so close that it is hard to imagine life without them" into the innermost circle. For
the middle circle, participants are instructed to write the initials of "people to whom you
may not feel quite that close but who are still important to you." For the outermost circle,
participants are instructed to write the initials of the "people whom you haven't already
mentioned but who are close enough and important enough in your life that they should
be placed in your personal network." Total network size is determined by adding up the
number of people in the diagram (Antonucci, 1986; Antonucci et ai., 2002). The
concentric circle diagram has been employed in many studies, including those making
cross-cultural comparisons, and is considered a valid measure of affective network size.
(Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987; Antonucci, 1986; Antonucci et ai., 2002; Brissette et ai.,
2000).
Interpersonal Support Evaluation List-Short Form
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The Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form (ISEL) was used to
measure perceived social support. The six items on the short form of the ISEL were
taken from the full version of the ISEL and reflect three functions of social support:
tangible support (i.e., instrumental support), belonging (i.e., how well one identifies with
one's social network), and appraisal support (i.e. informational support). Participants rate
each item on a 4-point scale; possible responses include definitely false, probably false,
probably true, and definitely true.

The full version of the ISEL has been shown to

correlate moderately with other scales of social support (Cohen et aI., 1985). The sixitem ISEL-SF has demonstrated good internal consistency (a = 0.73; (Williamson &
Schulz, 1992).
The Positive and Negative Social Exchange Measure
The Positive and Negative Social Exchange Measure was used to measure the
frequency of positive and negative social exchanges experienced by participants in the
past month. This 24-item self-report measure contains 12 items that measure the
frequency of positive social exchanges and 12 items that measure the frequency of
negative social exchanges. Each item begins with the phrase, "In the past month, how
often did the people you know ... ?" Participants respond using a 5-point Likert scale
ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). Positive exchange domains measured by the
positive exchange items include informational support, instrumental support, emotional
support, and companionship. Negative exchange domains measured by the negative
exchange items include unwanted advice or intrusion, failure to provide help,
unsympathetic or insensitive behavior, and rejection or neglect (Newsom, 2005).
Composite scales for negative and positive social exchanges both have very good internal
consistency, with a

=

.90 for each (Newsom et aI., 2005). The negative social exchange
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subcale (P ANSE - NSE) was used in the current study to measure frequency of negative
social exchanges in primary participants. Higher scores indicate greater frequency of
negative social exchanges.

Peer Report Social Functioning Scale (prSFS)
The Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale (prSFS) includes 38 items that
represent behaviors considered socially-inappropriate, socially appropriate, or
stereotyping and prejudicial (Henry et aI., 2009). An informant of the participant
completes the measure with regard to the primary participant's behaviors. The
instructions are, "Below are statements about particular topics of conversation. How
often does _ _ _ do the following things?" Items for the prSFS are based on previous
research concerning socially disturbing behaviors displayed by some older adults as well
as research with focus groups conducted specifically for the prSFS development (Henry
et aI., 2009). Eight of the items on the scale are filler items that were added to increase
the opportunity for informants to report positive aspects of the primary participants and to
decrease the sense of guilt that informants may feel from reporting negative qualities
about the primary participants. Informants use a 4-point scale (never, rarely,
occasionally, frequently) to reflect how often the primary participants engage in a
particular behavior. Subscales for social inappropriateness, social appropriateness, and
stereotyping and prejudicial behavior have demonstrated excellent internal consistency,
with Cronbach's alpha coefficients of .87, .92, and .75, respectively. The composite
measure that represents overall social functioning also demonstrated excellent internal
consistency (a = .94; Henry et aI., 2009), and was the variable for social functioning used
in the current study. Higher raw scores on the composite measure indicate better social
functioning. Significant correlations of the prSFS with a laboratory experiment in which
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socially-inappropriate and prejudicial behaviors were provoked provide additional
evidence of validity for the prSFS (Henry et aI., 2009).
Awareness Measures
Multiple methods of assessment of the construct awareness were used per Clare's
(2004; 2005) recommendation.

Participant-Informant Discrepancies on the Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory
Awareness Rating Scale - Revised (MARS-MFS)
The Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory Awareness Rating Scale Revised (MARS-MFS) measures subjective memory functioning. The scale was
designed for use with patients who have Alzheimer's disease, but has been used with
individuals who do not have diagnosis of dementia as well (Clare et aI., 2002).
Participants are asked how they would manage in certain situations in which they would
need to rely on their memory. Scores range from 0 (never) to 4 (always). Discrepancy
scores are calculated between parallel participant and informant versions. The MARSMFS also has very good psychometric properties. Internal consistency was excellent,
with a

=

.93. One-week test-retest reliability with participant self-rating was .91 and with

informant rating of the participant was .9. The MARS-MFS also demonstrated adequate
criterion validity, as it's correlations with other measures of awareness ranged from -.56
to -.74.

Participant-Informant Discrepancies on the Peer Report Social Functioning Scale (prSFS)
A parallel self-report version of the prSFS was created and given to participants
so that discrepancy scores could be calculated with respect to awareness of interpersonal
functioning. Although this was a novel use of this scale, comparison between informant
33

report and participant report on domains of function (i.e. IADLs, memory) is common
throughout the awareness literature (see reviews, Clare et aI., 2005a; Clare, 2004a).

Prediction of Performance Scores on the HVLT-R and Letter-Number Sequencing
Calculation of discrepancy scores between participants' predictions of how well
they will do on cognitive tasks versus their actual performance on those tasks is common
in the awareness literature (O'Keeffe et aI., 2007; Green et aI., 1993; Cosentino & Stem,
2005; Clare, 2004a; Clare et aI., 2005a). For the two tasks, participants were presented
with standard directions and then asked, "How well do you think you will do on this
task?" Participants were asked to rate how well they thought they would be able to do the
task using the following 5-point response scale (0-4): very poor (0), poor (1), alright (2),
good (3), and very good (4); this 5-point scale has been used in other measures of
awareness (Clare, 2002). Using the normed scores on the actual performance measures,
participants' actual performance was recoded according to the above scale. The HVLT-R
Trial 1 score was used as the standard for short-term memory and the LN-Seq Total score
was used as the standard for working memory. Scores 2 standard deviations (SDs) below
the mean were classified as "very poor" and were recoded as

o.

Scores between 1 and 2

SDs below the mean were classified as "poor" and were recoded as 1. Scores within 1
SD of the mean were assigned a score of2. Scores between 1 and 2 SDs above the mean
were assigned a score of 3. Scores above 3 SDs ofthe mean were assigned a score of 4.
Then actual performance was subtracted from predictions of performance to obtain
prediction awareness scores. Positive scores were hypothesized to reflect higher levels of
unawareness. A similar method was successfully used in a recent study (Graham et aI.,
2005).

Postdiction of Performance Scores on the HVLT-R and Letter-Number Sequencing
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Calculation of discrepancy scores between participants' actual scores on cognitive
tasks and their immediate assessment of their performance is hypothesized to indicate
online monitoring ability. Following the administration of the tasks above, participants
were asked to rate their performance on a five-point response scale (0-4): very poor (0),
poor (1), alright (2), good (3), and very good (4), which has been used effectively in other
postdiction measures of awareness (Clare et aI., 2002). Transformed, norm-based scores
which represent participants' actual cognitive performances were used to calculate
discrepancies. HVL T-R Total Recall (immediate recall over three trials) was used as the
standard for postdiction of memory, while LN-Seq Total score was used as the standard
for working memory. Actual performance was subtracted from postdiction assessments
of performance to obtain postdiction awareness scores. Positive scores were
hypothesized to reflect higher levels of unawareness and difficulties with online
monitoring. A similar method was successfully used in a recent study (Graham et aI.,
2005).
Theory of Mind

Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (EYES)
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (EYES) is a 36-item measure that
was created to detect subtle disturbances in social cognition. EYES has been identified
as a social-perceptual measure of ToM (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) that involves
the identification of complex mental states, which integrate emotions, beliefs, and
intentions. Before the introduction of the stimuli, participants are asked to read over a
glossary of mental state terms that are used on the test. They are then encouraged to
consult the glossary during EYES if there are any mental state terms of which they are
uncertain. Examples of mental state terms used on EYES include "irritated,"
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"depressed," and "accusing." During EYES, participants are shown a photograph of a
person's eye region and four similarly, emotionally-valenced complex mental state
words. Out of these four words, participants must select the word that best describes the
mental state that is being expressed by the person in the photograph. In the current study,
each item on EYES was presented on an 8 lh x 11 piece of paper. Participants were
asked to verbally indicate or point to their answer, which was recorded by the examiner.
The total EYES score is the total number of correct answers. Scores above 13 indicate
better than chance performance (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001).

Although groups of healthy

adults administered less complex tests of ToM often demonstrate ceiling effects, the
EYES scores of healthy adults have demonstrated a normal distribution (Baron-Cohen et
aI.,2001).
Validity for EYES has been established by the test's ability to discriminate
clinical groups with social deficits from healthy groups or other clinical groups (Craig et
aI., 2004; Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001; Gregory et aI., 2002). EYES has successfully
discriminated adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger's disorder from normal
controls and was inversely correlated with a measure of autistic traits that included items
assessing social skills and communicative abilities (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2001). EYES
also predicted social functioning better than traditional neuropsychological tests in
patients with schizophrenia (Bora et aI., 2006). An older version of the test that was not
as sensitive as the revised version also found differences in performance between
participants diagnosed with fvFTD and those diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease or
healthy older adults (Gregory et aI., 2002) and between healthy adults and patients with
fvFTD who scored above the cut-point for dementia on a test of global cognitive
functioning (Torralva et aI., 2009).
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Faux Pas Test
The Faux Pas Test (Stone et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 2002) contains 10 stories in
which a character commits a social faux pas and 10 control stories in which characters
interact without a faux pas occurring. The Faux Pas Test requires participants to
represent two mental states: the mental state ofthe person committing the faux pas and
the mental state of the other person in the story, who may feel disturbed by the faux pas.
Validity for the Faux Pas test has been established through its utility in detecting clinical
groups characterized by poor social functioning. Patients with fvFTD (Gregory et aI.,
2002), bilateral lesions in the orbito-frontal cortex (Stone et aI., 1998), and Asperger's
syndrome (Zalla et aI., 2009) tend to perform more poorly on the Faux Pas Test
compared to healthy controls. Additionally, the Faux Pas Test has correlated with other
measures of ToM (Gregory et aI., 2002).
For the Faux Pas Test, the stories were read aloud by the examiner and a copy
was also placed in front of the participant for reference in order to reduce task demands
on working memory. After each vignette was read, participants were asked, "Did anyone
say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?" If the participant
indicated that a faux pas occurred in the vignette, then the examiner probed the depth of
the participant's understanding of the faux pas with standard follow-up questions. For
each of the 20 vignettes, examiners also asked two control questions that tested
participant comprehension of the story. Index scores were prorated in order to control
for comprehension difficulties. In other words, if individuals missed the control
questions for a vignette, all questions related to that vignette were thrown out and index
scores were calculated based only on vignettes in which individuals correctly answered
the control questions (Gregory et aI., 2002, Stone et aI., 1998).
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Studies have used different methods to calculate Faux Pas Test index scores, and
the test authors recommend examining different indices (Gregory et aI., 2002; Stone et
aI., 1998; Torralva et aI., 2007; Torralva et aI., 2009; MacPherson et aI., 2002).
Consistent with other studies (Gregory et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007), the current
study examined the proportion of correct hits on faux pas stories (FP HITS) and the
proportion of correct rejections of control stories (FP REJECTIONS). A Faux Pas
Composite score (FP Composite); which combined FP HITS, responses to two faux pas
understanding follow-up questions, and FP REJECTIONS; was calculated, as this index
has been used in prior studies and has been found to significantly differentiate patients
with fVFTD from patients with Alzheimer's disease and healthy controls (Gregory et aI.,
2002; Torralva et aI., 2007). The two faux pas understanding follow-up questions were:
1) "Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?" and 2) "Why do you
think he/she said it?"
Procedures
Persons responding to advertisements were provided with a description of the
study over the telephone and invited to participate. Those who agreed to participate and
who met the inclusion criteria had the option of participating in the study within their
own home or at another mutually agreed upon location, such as the researcher's lab or a
senior center, that offered relatively private, quiet, and well-lit testing conditions. Fiftythree participating pairs (67.9%) elected to participate within a home environment and 25
(32.1 %) participating pairs elected to participate on the university campus.
Before data collection began, both the participant and the informant were
informed about the study, the likely benefits of participation, and the possible risks of
participation. If individuals had difficulty reading, self-report measures were read to
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them. On average, primary participants completed the study in 144 minutes (SD = 28
minutes) and informants completed the study in 27 minutes (SD = 9 minutes). Thirty
primary participants also participated in the informant role.
In order to maintain confidentiality, participants were assigned an ID number.
Informant responses were coded under the primary participants' ID numbers. Scoring of
the measures was carried out by trained researchers. Although one research assistant was
trained to score each participant's Faux Pas Test, another trained researcher
independently scored stratified random selections across the sample in order to establish
interrater reliability and manage scoring drift. Using this method, interrater reliability
was calculated to be r = .97. Scores and demographic information were entered into a
database and stored in a locked filing cabinet.

Data Analysis
Statistical analyses were carried out using PASW and AMOS versions 18.0.
Alpha was set at .05 for all analyses. Descriptive data analyses were completed first.
As noted above, the two primary hypotheses concerned the utility of ToM measures in
predicting social relations and awareness. The hypothesis regarding ToM and the social
variables was examined initially using bivariate correlations and t tests. Cognitive and
demographic variables were also included in the correlational analyses in order to
determine whether they significantly accounted for variance in any ofthe primary
variables of interest; they were only included in subsequent analyses if bivariate
correlations indicated a significant relationship with primary variables. Path analysis was
planned to test the hypothesized model depicted in Figure 1 between ToM and the social
variables. T tests were used to compare participants performing in the impaired range on
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ToM measures with participants performing in the non-impaired range with regard to the
social relations variables.
The hypotheses regarding the relationship between ToM and unawareness of
ability were similarly explored with bivariate correlations and t tests along with select
demographic and cognitive variables. The model depicted in Figure 2 was tested using
path analysis. T tests were used to compare participants performing in the impaired
range on ToM measures with participants performing in the non-impaired range with
regard to the awareness variables.
Three participants had one item missing on the PANSE-NSE or prSFS. Person
mean substitution was used to impute the missing data in these cases (Hawthorne &
Elliott, 2005). Cases in which more than one item was missing and summary or index
scores could not be calculated were generally not included in analyses involving those
variables.
As parametric statistics were planned, the primary variables (ToM, awareness,
social relations) were explored for their consistency with statistical assumptions and to
screen for outliers. Several transformations were applied to the data due to significant
skewness (z > 2.58), ceiling effects, or the presence of outliers (Field, 2005). These
transformations and the meaning of the subsequent scores are detailed in Table 3, which
also provides a reference for acronyms and abbreviations used in the study. As noted in
the table, square root transformations were applied to the following variables: FP
Composite score, EYES score, prSFS Social Functioning Composite score, convoy
measure of total network size, and negative social exchanges. A natural log
transformation was applied to the ISEL (perceived social support) score. A reciprocal
transformation was applied to the CMI and visual acuity scores. Attempted square root,
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logarithmic, and reciprocal transformations of the memory awareness score for the
MARS-MFS failed due to the presence of an extreme outlier. The outlying case was then
removed from analyses involving the MARS-MFS awareness score, which corrected the
problems with the distribution of this variable.
Gregory et aI. (2002) defined impairment on the EYES, FP Composite score, FP
HITS, and Faux Pas REJECTIONS as proportion scores that fell 1.5 standard deviations
below the mean of the healthy control group. Using the cut-scores established by
Gregory et aI. (2002), the current sample was classified as impaired versus non-impaired
on the Faux Pas variables. As Gregory et aI. (2002) used an older version of EYES in
their study, their recommended cut-score was not used in the current study for EYES.
However, their recommended methods were used, as a cut-score 1.5 standard deviations
below the current sample's raw EYES mean was used to define impairment on EYES in
the current study.
Statistical Power
1.

Hypotheses related to social relations:
As shown in Table 2, selected effect sizes from published studies concerning the

relationship of ToM with different measures of social functioning across different
populations suggested medium to large effect sizes.

Though effect sizes that isolated

the relationship between ToM and social functioning in older adults were not available,
two studies have been performed using multiple regression. The first study tested ToM
as a mediator between age and participation in pro social activities, but found that ToM
was not a mediator in the relationship and reported no relevant statistical results (Henry et
aI., 2009). The second study found that social cognition (ToM and emotion identification
from faces) accounted for 38% of the variance in social intimacy in nursing home
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residents with and without cognitive impairment (N=40) after controlling for gender, age,
education, global cognitive functioning, and working memory (Washburn et aI., 2003).
When emotion identification was controlled for as well, ToM accounted for an additional
8% of the variance. This indicates a large effect size (f = 0.33).
2. Hypotheses related to unawareness of ability
As noted in the introduction, there have been two studies involving awareness and
patients with AD (Cuerva et aI., 2001; Caoile, 2002). One study reported no association
with 39 patients with AD, but used a ToM measure that appears to rely heavily on
working memory (Cuerva et aI., 2001). Because that study did not control for working
memory in their analysis, it is possible that ToM may have been significantly confounded
with working memory ability. The other study, which examined individual differences in
ToM performance across 17 participants with AD and 18 healthy controls, found that the
relationship between ToM and insight into ability was significant with r = -.645, which is
a large effect size (Caoile, 2002). However, this study did not control for possible
confounding variables such as overall cognitive ability. No other studies appear to have
investigated this link directly. Studies that support the relationship between ToM and
unawareness into ability level, such as studies of insight in patients with fvFTD (who
perform poorly on ToM tasks), suggest that low levels of ToM will produce profound
deficits in awareness and indicate a large effect size. Because the first study of
unawareness and ToM found no relationship, however, the more conservative medium
effect size is more appropriate for these analyses.
Sample Size
In path analysis, sample size is usually determined based on the number of free
parameters estimated. However, there is debate regarding the optimal number of cases
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per estimated parameter in order to achieve adequate power to reject the null hypothesis
while avoiding Type I error, which is more likely to occur in path analysis with very
large sample sizes. Bollen (Bollen, 1989) has suggested that three cases per free
parameter are necessary, whereas Bentler (Bentler, 1993) is more conservative and
recommends at least 5 cases per free parameter. The model depicted in Figure 1 contains
15 free parameters. Thus, for the social relations and ToM model, the smallest adequate
sample size was between 45 (3 x 15; Bollen, 1989) and 75 (5 x 15; Bentler, 1993). The
model of ToM and awareness depicted in Figure 2 contains 21 free parameters and
requires a sample size that is at least between 63 (3 x 21; Bollen, 1989) and 105 (5 x 21 ;
Bentler, 1993). Based on these guidelines, the current sample of78 was likely adequate
to test the model of ToM and social relations, but may have lacked sufficient power to
adequately test the model of ToM and awareness.
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RESULTS

Demographics and Characterization of sample

A reference with study abbreviations and guidelines for interpreting variables that
underwent transformation for analyses is found in Table 3. The demographic
characteristics of the primary participants and their informants are presented in Table 4.
The mean age of primary participants was 68.79 years old (SO

=

7.75 years), with 62.8%

of the sample below the age of70 years and 84.6% of the sample below the age of80
years. The mean age of informants was 59.33 years, with informant ages ranging from
21 years to 87 years. Slightly more than half(57.9%) of informants were 60 or more
years old. As can be seen in Table 4, primary participants and informants tended to
identify themselves as non-Hispanic White (92.3% and 88.5%, respectively) and female
(70.5% and 75.6%, respectively). The sample was almost evenly divided between
married/partnered and non-married participants, with 43.6% of primary participants and
47.4% of informants reporting that they were married or partnered. Relatively high
socioeconomic status (SES) characterized an unusually high portion of the sample, as
56.5% of primary participants and 53.3% of informants reported having at least a
bachelor's degree and approximately 40% of both participants and informants reported a
household income greater than $60,000 per year.

The sample was also very healthy, as

the majority of primary participants (88.5%) and informants (88.2%) rated their health as
good, very good, or excellent. More objective measures of health, such as the eMI and
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vascular risk composite score also indicated low levels of illness in primary participants.
On average, primary participants reported <1 (M = 0.75, SD = 1.2) comorbid health
condition on the CMI, with 61.3% reporting no health conditions. Similarly, primary
participants reported a mean of 1.03 (SD = 1.1) vascular risk conditions, with 71.8% of
the sample reporting 0-1 vascular risk conditions. Notably, 4 participants reported having
a history of cerebrovascular accident (stroke), with the mean time since stroke 19.8
months (SD

=

18.6 months) prior to the study. Using the screening measure for

Parkinson's disease (PD), 48 (61.5%) of the primary participants screened negative for
PD and 29 (37.2%) of the primary participants screened positive for PD. The group
screening positive for PD reported significantly higher levels of comorbidity (t(72)

= -

2.20, P = .03) and rated their health more poorly (t (75) = 2.9, P < .01) than the group
screening negative for PD. Bivariate correlations indicated that cumulative vascular risk
was significantly associated with both primary participant self-rating of health (r = -.452,
P < .001) and comorbid health conditions (r = .354, p < .01), while self-rating of health
and the CMI were not significantly associated with one another in this sample.
Both primary participants and informants tended to report a low level of
depressive symptoms. The mean GDS score (possible range of 0-15) for primary
participants was 1.51 (95% CI [1.17, 1.92]), with only 4 primary participants (5.2%)
endorsing a significant level of depressive symptoms, as determined by endorsement of
more than 5 items (Hermann et aI., 1996). The mean GDS score for informants was 1.lO
(95% CI [0.79, 1.44]), with only 3 informants (3.9%) endorsing a significant level of
depressive symptoms.
As can be seen in Table 5, the sample of primary participants in the current study
was characterized by slightly higher than average cognitive functioning. With the
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exception of the measure of verbal IQ (NAART), all scores on cognitive measures were
adjusted for age. There were two participants (2.6%) who obtained raw scores for global
cognitive functioning (DRS-2) that were at or below the cut-off score of 123 for dementia
(Jurica et aI., 2001).

When these two scores were adjusted for age and education, they

indicated the presence of cognitive impairment.
The relationship between the participants and their informants is detailed in Table
6. Most informants were likely peers of primary participants, as 42.9% categorized
themselves as friends or siblings and 26% categorized themselves as spouses.
Approximately 20% of the informants were the child or children-in-Iaw of primary
participants. On average, informants knew primary participants for 30.19 years (SD =
19.22). For the majority of the sample, the frequency of contact was high, with 88.4% of
informants reporting interaction at least multiple times per week with primary
participants.
Characterization of Performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) Variables
Means and confidence intervals for the two primary ToM measures, the Faux Pas
Test and EYES, are displayed in Tables 7 and 8, along with comparison data from recent
studies utilizing these measures with non-clinical, older adult samples. While the mean
value for EYES in the current study appears slightly above the mean EYES scores in the
comparison studies, the current sample is also younger. As can be seen in Table 8, the FP
Composite proportion score for the current study appears much lower than the FP
composite proportion score from the study by Gregory et aI. (2002), which was based on
only 10 participants - who were younger on average than the participants in the current
study. The bivariate correlation between the EYES test and the FP Composite score was
not significant (r = .1 0, p > .05).
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The scores for FP HITS and FP REJECTIONS appear similar between the current
study and the two comparison studies. As a reminder, the FP HITS score refers to correct
identification of stories with a faux pas as containing faux pas, while the FP
REJECTIONS score refers to correct identification of a story without a faux pas as not
containing a faux pas. In the current study, 61 participants correctly identified 100% of
the stories on the Faux Pas test as containing a faux pas (FP HITS), while 17 participants
scored less than 100% correct for FP HITS. With regard to FP REJECTIONS, 46
participants correctly rejected 100% of stories on the Faux Pas Test that did not contain a
Faux Pas, while 32 participants scored less than 100% correct. As scores for FP HITS
and FP REJECTIONS demonstrated significant ceiling effects, their inclusion in
subsequent analyses was limited.
As noted in the Methods section, impairment on the ToM measures was also
examined based on previously published criteria (Gregory et aI., 2002). Note that while
the cut-scores for the Faux Pas test indices were taken from a study comparing patients
with dementia and healthy controls, the cut-score for the EYES test used in the current
study was based on the raw mean and standard deviation (1.5 SD below the mean) of the
current sample, as cut scores were not available in the literature for the revised version of
the EYES test. Thus, the term impairment is used for simplicity with regard to both Faux
Pas test and EYES performance in the current study, but may actually indicate relatively
low performance within the current sample with regard to EYES performance.
Eight participants scored in the impaired range on the EYES test, two participants
scored in the impaired range for FP HITS, and ten participants scored in the impaired
range for FP REJECTIONS. Twenty-four participants scored in the impaired range on
the FP Composite score, and impairment on this index was examined further, given the
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relatively low rates of impairment on FP HITS and FP REJECTIONS, which collectively
make up 50% of the FP Composite score. For the first follow-up question (Why
shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?), 52.6% of the sample obtained
100% correct and 74.4% obtained 90% or more correct. For the second follow-up
question (Why do you think he/she said it?), 2.6% of the sample achieved 100% correct
and 67.9% of the sample achieved 50% or less correct. Across participants, 48.4% of
responses to the explanation question were correct. Thus, performance on the second
follow-up question, which concerns attribution and explanation of behavior, appears to at
least partially explain the lower FP Composite scores in the current study compared to
extant studies as well as the greater numbers of participants in the current study who were
categorized as impaired on the FP Composite score compared to the other ToM measures
of impairment.
Impairment on one ToM index did not necessarily predict impairment on other
ToM indices (EYES and FP Composite: (X2 (1) = 1.55, P = 0.21; EYES and FP
REJECTIONS

(l (1) =

1.18, p = 0.28).

Only 4 participants (5.1 %) performed in the

impaired range on a Faux Pas Test index and EYES. One participant (1.3%) performed
in the impaired range across all four ToM impairment indices, one participant (1.3%)
performed in the impaired range across three ToM impairment indices (EYES, FP
Composite, and FP REJECTIONS), and eight participants (10.2%) performed in the
impaired range on two ToM impairment indices. As only two participants !llet criteria
for impairment on FP HITS, chi-square analysis was not appropriate. However, there
was no apparent pattern of impairment for the two participants scoring in the impaired
range on FP HITS, as one of the participants scored in the impaired range across all ToM
measures, while the other scored in the impaired range on the closely-related FP
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Composite score only.

One of the participants scored in the impaired range (T score =

21) on the HVLT-R Delayed Recall. Both participants were in their early 60's, had at
least a college education, and performed in at least the average range on other cognitive
measures.
Characterization of Performance on Social Relations Variables

The social relations variables are detailed in Tables 9 and 10. As shown in Table
9, primary participants' social networks contained a mean of24.60 individuals (based on
transformed data). On average, primary participants reported low levels of negative
social exchanges and high levels of social support, and informants tended to rate primary
participants as exhibiting relatively high levels of social functioning. As shown in Table
10, higher levels of perceived social support were associated with larger social networks
and reduced frequency of negative social exchanges. The informant-rated measure of
social functioning (prSFS) was not significantly associated with the other social relations
measures, which were completed by the primary participants themselves.
Characterization of Performance on Awareness Variables

As displayed in Table 11, mean discrepancy scores were minimal across the
awareness measures, with primary participants tending to slightly underestimate their
performance or functioning on average.

Given the larger range of possible discrepancy

scores on the MARS-MFS and prSFS, the likelihood of obtaining a discrepancy score of

owas much lower than on the performance-based measures.

Thus, a larger portion of the

sample is categorized as underestimating or overestimating performance on the
informant-based measures. The transformed discrepancy scores were used in subsequent
analyses.
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Bivariate correlations were used to test the relationships between the awareness
variables, and the results are depicted in Table 12. The two informant-based measures of
awareness (prSFS and MARS-MFS) were significantly positively associated (r = .28, p <
.05), indicating that individuals who overestimated social functioning were also likely to
overestimate memory functioning. Primary participant and informant ratings of social
functioning were not significantly associated (r =

-

.18, P = .12). Informant ratings of

primary participant memory on the MARS-MFS were not significantly related to primary
participant ratings on the MARS-MFS (r = .16, P = .17) or actual memory performance
on the HVLT -R (r = 0, p > .05), whereas primary participant ratings of memory
performance on the MARS-MFS were significantly related to actual memory
performance on the HVLT-R (r = -.31, P < .01). Although primary participant and
informant ratings were not correlated on either the MARS-MFS or prSFS, primary
participant ratings and informant ratings across the measures were similarly correlated (r
=

.25, P < .05; r = -.25, P < .05, respectively (correlation for informant ratings is negative

due to transformed variable)), which may indicate response style. The performancebased measures of awareness were significantly correlated within the cognitive domains
(predictions and postdictions were correlated on the two cognitive measures), but
otherwise, the performance-based measures were not correlated with one another or with
either of the informant-based measures of awareness. As shown in Tables 12 and 13, the
performance-based measures of awareness were also significantly associated with the
associated cognitive variable used to gauge actual performance as well as between the
prediction awareness and postdiction awareness scores based on each measure.
Regarding the actual ratings of performance, the HVLT-R prediction ratings were not
significantly associated with performance (r = .08, P > .05), but the HVLT -R postdiction
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ratings were associated with performance (r = .52, P < .001). Both the LN-Seq
prediction and postdiction ratings were significantly associated with performance (r =
.44, P < .001, r = .30, P < .01, respectively).

Associations between Primary Variables, Demographics, Health, and Depression
The impact of key demographic variables, such as gender and ethnicity, on the
primary variables (ToM, awareness, and social relations) was tested with t tests. The
performance-based memory awareness scores significantly differed according to gender
(Table 14). On average, men tended to overestimate memory performance, while
females tended to underestimate memory performance (Table 14). Gender did not
differentiate scores on the other primary variables and was not associated with impaired
versus non-impaired performance on the ToM measures.
Although the majority of the sample identified themselves as non-Hispanic White
with regard to ethnicity, ethnicity was cautiously considered by comparing performance
on primary study variables, as well as demographic and cognitive variables, between
African-American primary participants (n = 5) and non-Hispanic White (n = 72) primary
participants using t tests. Significant results are displayed in Table 15. As shown in the
table, FP Composite scores were significantly lower for the African-American group
compared to the non-Hispanic White group. Significantly, 4 out of5 of the AfricanAmerican participants scored in the impaired range with the FP Composite score

(l (1,

N=77) = 5.94, p = .02). The impairment scores for FP REJECTIONS and EYES did not
demonstrate a significant association with ethnicity ("l (1, N = 77) = 3.45, p> .05;

"I: (1,

N = 77) = 0.53, P > .05, respectively). The African-American group also overpredicted
memory performance on the HVLT -R Prediction awareness measure compared to the
non-Hispanic White group, which underpredicted performance on average. Ttests
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comparing the non-Hispanic White group and African-American group on demographic
and cognitive measures revealed significant differences in self-ratings of health between
the two groups, with African-American participants rating their health significantly worse
than non-Hispanic White participants. Differences in level of education and verbal IQ
between the African-American group and the non-Hispanic White group also approached
significance, with the African-American group reporting lower levels of education and
obtaining slightly lower verbal IQ scores compared to non-Hispanic Whites.
The relationships between age, education level, depression level, health variables,
and ToM, awareness, and social relations were tested using bivariate correlations and are
depicted in Tables 10, 12, and 16. Greater memory awareness as measured by HVLT-R
postdiction awareness score was significantly associated with higher levels of education,
but education was not significantly associated with any of the other primary variables.
Older age was also significantly associated with poorer performance on the EYES test (r
=

.33, p < .01), but was not associated with the FP Composite score, any of the social

relations variables, or any of the awareness variables.
Regarding health, greater medical comorbidity was associated with poorer
performance on the Faux Pas Test (r = .24, P < .05). Lower levels of vascular risk were
associated with larger social networks (r = -.42, P < .01), higher levels of perceived social
support (r = .25, p < .01), and better social functioning (r = .24, P < .05). Primary
participant self-rating of health was also associated with higher levels of perceived social
support (r = -.27, P < .05).

PD screening status did not differentiate scores on any of

the primary variables.
Despite relatively low endorsement of depressive symptoms across the sample,
depressive symptoms in primary participants were significantly correlated with all social
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relations measures. Specifically, higher levels of depressive symptoms in primary
participants were associated with smaller social network size (r = -.30, p < .01), higher
frequency of negative social exchanges (r = .27, P < .05), lower levels of perceived social
support (r = .38, P < .01), and lower levels of social functioning (r = .24, P < .05).
Neither ToM nor any ofthe awareness measures were significantly associated with
depressive symptoms in primary participants with correlational analyses. However, the
difference between the impaired and non-impaired participants on the EYES test
approached significance with regard to depressive symptoms (t(76) = -1.89, P = 0.06),
with the impaired group reporting fewer depressive symptoms (M = 0.66, 95% CI
[0,1.79]) compared to the non-impaired group (M =1.64, 95% CI[1.26, 2.08]).

Associations between Primary Variables and Cognition
Tables 17-19 display bivariate correlations between the primary variables, visual
acuity, and cognitive variables. As shown in Table 17, all of the cognitive measures were
significantly associated with one another. Regarding the ToM measures, the EYES test
was significantly associated with visual acuity (r = .27, P < .05) and all measures of
cognition, with the exception of the FAB. Essentially, better performance across
cognitive measures was predictive of better performance on EYES. The Faux Pas Test
was not significantly associated with any of the cognitive measures or with visual acuity.
T tests comparing cognitive functioning between the impaired and non-impaired groups

on the ToM measures found similar results with regard to EYES, but also indicated that
the impaired groups on both EYES and FP REJECTIONS obtained lower scores on the
FAB (see Table 20). Additionally, the impaired group on the FP Composite score had a
significantly lower verbal IQ than the non-impaired group (see Table 20).
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Regarding the social relations variables (see Table 18), larger social network size
was significantly associated with better global cognitive functioning (r = .28, p < .05),
better memory (r = -.33, p < .01), and better working memory (r = .28, p < .05). Greater
perceived social support was significantly associated with better global cognition (r =

-

.24, p < .05), and better social functioning was significantly associated with better
memory (r = -.27, p < .05).
For the awareness variables (results displayed in Table 19), neither informantbased memory awareness nor social functioning awareness were significantly associated
with any of the cognitive variables included in the study. Overprediction as measured by
the HVLT -R prediction awareness score was associated with poorer global cognitive
functioning (r = -.23, p < .05), poorer memory r = .55, p < .01), and poorer frontal lobe
functioning (r = .31, p < .01). None of the other performance-based measures of
awareness were significantly associated with other cognitive variables.
Hypothesis J:

Hypothesis 1 stated that ToM ability would predict social relations, and the
hypothesis was tested with bivariate correlations, t tests, and path analysis. As can be
seen in Table 21, bivariate correlations did not support a significant relationship between
ToM and any of the social relations variables.

Ttests comparing impaired versus non-

impaired performance on ToM measures also did not indicate that ToM is related to
social relations. Because ethnicity was associated with FP Composite performance and
there were few minority participants who participated in the study, the correlational
analyses were repeated excluding all ethnicities except for non-Hispanic White
participants. The analyses including only the non-Hispanic White participants remained
non-significant.
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The model depicting the relationship between ToM and social relations that is
shown in Figure 1 was tested using path analysis with all participant data. As suggested
by the correlational analyses and depicted in Figure 3, ToM ability did not predict social
relations as there were no direct effects for either of the ToM variables on any of the
social relations variables. The model was a poor fit for the data (X2 (6) = 26.33, p < .001;
l/df= 4.39; CFI = 0; Nfl = .17, IF! = .21, TLI = -2.06, RMSEA = 0.21). More than
90% of the variance in each of the social relations variables was unexplained by the
model.
Hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2 stated that ToM ability would predict problems with awareness of
cognitive and social abilities. The hypothesis was tested with bivariate correlations, t
tests, and path analysis. As can be seen in Table 22, the sole significant correlation
between ToM and awareness was found between the FP Composite score and the MARSMFS awareness score (r = -.25, p < .05). However, this relationship was not in the
predicted direction, as better FP Composite scores were associated with overestimation of
memory function (i.e. less awareness).
Because ethnicity differentiated Faux Pas performance and the HVLT-R-based
awareness measures and because minority participation was low in the study, the
correlational analyses were repeated excluding all ethnicities except for non-Hispanic
White participants (n = 72). The results were similar, except that the FP Composite score
was no longer significantly associated with memory awareness as measured by the
MARS-MFS (r = -.21, P = .09, n = 71), and the FP Composite Score was significantly
associated with working memory awareness (LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness; r = -.25, P
= .03, n = 70). Similar to memory awareness, this correlation was in the opposite
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direction, with better FP Composite scores associated with overestimation of working
memory performance on the Letter-Number Sequencing subtest.
T tests were also used to test whether impairment on ToM measures significantly

impacted scores for awareness. The results, which are displayed in Table 23, found
significant differences in memory awareness, as measured by the MARS-MFS, between
the impaired and non-impaired groups on the FP Composite score and FP REJECTIONS.
An examination of the means for both measures of impairment indicates that while the
impaired groups did not overestimate their memory function as hypothesized, their
estimations were far less accurate than the non-impaired groups. In other words, the
impaired group significantly underestimated their memory functioning compared to the
non-impaired group, which demonstrated more accuracy in the estimations. Differences
between the impaired and non-impaired groups on EYES also approached significance
with regard to prediction of social awareness (prSFS), and the means for the discrepancy
scores for each group also suggest a tendency toward underprediction in the impaired
group. While the performance-based measures of awareness did not demonstrate
significant differences according to the presence of impairment, two relationships
approached significance. Differences between the impaired and non-impaired groups on
FP REJECTIONS approached significance with regard to memory awareness on the
HVL T-R Postdiction Awareness measure. Examination of the means indicated that the
differences were in the hypothesized direction, with the impaired group overestimating
their performance and the non-impaired group providing more accurate estimates of
performance, on average.

Differences between the impaired and non-impaired groups

on EYES also approached significance for the LN-Seq Prediction Awareness measure.
However, the means for the impaired and non-impaired groups, while approaching a
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significant difference, indicated that both groups underestimated performance on average,
with the non-impaired group less accurate than the impaired group on average.
The model depicting the relationship between ToM and awareness that is shown
in Figure 2 was tested using path analysis with all ethnicities included. As suggested by
the correlational analyses and depicted in Figure 4, ToM ability only predicted MARSMFS awareness scores. The model was a poor fit for the data (X2 (15) = 73.14, P < .001;
l/df= 4.88; OFI = .81, CFI = .07; NFl = .19, IFI = .23, TLI = -.74, RMSEA = 0.23).
While the model explained 7.9% of the variance in MARS-MFS scores, the model failed
to account for at least 95% of the variance in the each ofthe other awareness variables.
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DISCUSSION

The current study aimed to establish empirical links between ToM and two
conceptually-related constructs, social relations and awareness, in a sample of community
dwelling older adults.

Despite the use of empirically validated measures for the three

primary constructs, the hypotheses were generally not supported by the data. Neither
ToM measure predicted the social relations variables using correlational analysis, and
impairment on ToM tests did not significantly impact social relations scores. The results
suggested potential links between awareness and ToM, but the findings were mixed, with
one hypothesized association that only approached significance and other significant
associations in the opposite direction of the original hypothesis. Possible explanations
for the results are discussed in the sections below, along with the implications of the
study findings. First, issues related to ToM that span both hypotheses are discussed,
followed by the implications of the findings related to each main hypothesis. For
reference purposes, Table 24 provides an overview of basic associations between all the
ToM indices and most study variables.
What is the meaning and clinical relevance of impairment on ToM tests in communitydwelling older adults?
Both of the measures of ToM that were used in the current study are theorized to
measure advanced ToM abilities, and scores on these measures may reflect subtle
differences in ToM across healthy older adults. Prior studies with patients with fvFTD
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and healthy controls have found significant differences between the groups on all ToM
indices (EYES, FP REJECTIONS, FP HITS, and FP Composite) used in the current
study (Gregory et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007). EYES and the Faux Pas Test were not
significantly associated with one another in the current study. The lack of association
between the two ToM measures is consistent with the findings of Gregory et aI. (2002),
but inconsistent with the findings of Torralva et aI. (2007). Notably, both studies
compared ToM performance in healthy controls and patients with fvFTD, and the
Gregory et aI. study included patients with AD as well. In the Gregory et aI. study, the
Faux Pas Test correlated with other ToM tests, but the EYES test did not.

Although

both tests are considered measures of ToM, the EYES test has been related to socioperceptual ability, while the Faux Pas test supposedly measures integration of cognitive
and emotional information within a social context (Tager-Flusberg et aI., 2000; Stone et
aI., 1998; Shamay-Tsoory et aI., 2007). In sum, because EYES and the Faux Pas Test are
thought to measure slightly different aspects of advanced ToM, they may not always
correlate.
Comparisons of mean FP Composite scores and EYES scores with previous
samples of community-dwelling older adults suggest that the current sample performed
similarly with regard to EYES, FP HITS, and FP REJECTIONS. However, the mean FP
Composite score for the current study was one standard deviation lower than the mean of
one of the comparison studies (Gregory et aI., 2002). Notably, the comparison study by
Gregory et aI. (2002) used a much smaller sample (n=10) that was also ten years younger
on average than the current sample (Table 8). On the other hand, the current sample had
higher levels of education than the healthy controls in the Gregory et aI. study (mean =
12.1 years, SD = 1.5 years), but greater ToM impairment was found in the current sample
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than in the healthy controls in the Gregory et aI. study. While age may explain the lower
scores on the FP Composite measure, the current study's findings may also indicate the
presence of subtle ToM deficits in community-dwelling older adults.
This is the first study to examine the presence of ToM impairment (defined as
performance 1.5 standard deviations below the mean) in community-dwelling older
adults. Notably, the two clinical studies of older adults that utilized both EYES and the
Faux Pas Test compared patients with fvFTD to "healthy controls" who were matched for
age and education. Only one of these studies compared impaired vs. non-impaired
performance on the ToM measures (Gregory et aI., 2002), and that study found no
impairment in the control group on either ToM test, which may be related to the stringent
screening of control participants for clinical studies in order to categorize them as
"healthy." In community-dwelling samples, researchers have shown that older adults
tend to perform worse on EYES compared to younger adults, but the findings comparing
older adults and younger adults on the Faux Pas Test have been mixed (see Table 1).
The current study adds to the literature with the finding of impairment on ToM
tests in community-dwelling older adults without a formal diagnosis of dementia and
with relatively normal cognitive performance. Some level of impairment on ToM was
expected across the sample based on the likelihood that some participants would have
experienced changes in brain regions (e.g. medial and ventromedial areas of prefrontal
cortex) that are thought to underlie ToM ability (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006; Gregory et aI,
2002; Gallagher et aI., 2000; Rowe et aI., 2001; Baird et aI., 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006;
Stuss et aI., 2001). Consistent with these expectations, impairment on ToM measures
was found across participants, with 10% - 30% of the sample demonstrating impairment
on each of the following ToM indices: EYES, FP REJECTIONS, and the FP Composite
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score, which includes questions related to faux pas understanding. Impairment was
defined by Gregory et aI. (2002) as performance 1.5 standard deviations below the mean
of their healthy controls. It is possible that the rates of impairment on ToM in the current
study would have been significantly lower if the more typical cut-off for impairment - 2
standard deviations below the mean of the normative sample - was used. Though age
effects were not found within the current sample, it is important to note that the standard
of impairment used for the FP Composite score was derived from healthy controls
participating in a clinical study and they were approximately 10 years younger on
average than the primary participants in the current study.

These findings suggest that

research to establish age-based normative data may be useful in delineating impairment
on ToM tests in older adults.
Participants meeting criteria for impairment varied across the ToM indices, with
only 12.8% of the sample demonstrating impairment on more than one ToM index.
Varying patterns of impairment may be related to true differences in the aspect of ToM
being measured by each index or may be explained by differences in general cognitive
processes needed to carry out each ToM task. FP HITS demonstrated the least
impairment, with only 2 participants scoring in the impaired range. Importantly, a study
comparing adult patients with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) to healthy controls on the Faux
Pas Test found no differences in FP HITS between the groups, but significant differences
in FP REJECTIONS, with the AS group more likely to incorrectly identify a faux pas as
occurring in a story without a faux pas (Zalla et aI., 2009). FP REJECTIONS may
strongly indicate ToM-specific impairment, as patients with AS have been noted to have
ToM-specific impairment in the absence of other general cognitive impairment (BaronCohen, 2001). At the same time, however, the impaired group on FP REJECTIONS in
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the current study also had significantly lower FAB performance, indicating that frontal
lobe dysfunction may at least partially account for the poorer scores on FP
REJECTIONS. Certainly, more research is needed to clarify whether differences in
general cognitive processes contribute to performance on each index.
The FP Composite scores demonstrated very high levels of impairment, with 30%
of the sample falling in the impaired range. The means for the FP Composite score also
appeared much lower for the current sample compared to those ofthe healthy controls in
Gregory et aI. (2002). The high rates of impairment were most likely related to high rates
of incorrect responses to the explanation/attribution question (e.g., "Why did he/she say
it?"). Relatively high rates of correct responses were found for FP HITS, FP
REJECTIONS, and identification of the faux pas, but only 48.4% of responses across the
sample were correct for the explanation/attribution question.
Although an analysis of the explanation/attribution question was not carried out in
the current study, the literature suggests that non-clinical samples may exhibit some
difficulty with this question. For example, one study that found differences on the Faux
Pas Test between older adults and younger adults noted that the older adults
demonstrated particularly poor performance on the questions related to faux pas
understanding (Wang et aI., 2006). Zalla et aI. (2009) carried out a detailed study of the
responses to the explanation/attribution question with adult patients with AS and healthy
controls. While only 39.3% of the explanation/attribution questions were answered
correctly by the AS group, the control group (mean age = 27.8 years, SD = 4.5 years)
answered 78.7% of the explanation/attribution questions correctly. The authors' analysis
of the errors on this question found that both the AS group and the control group
erroneously attributed the faux pas to a character's psychological traits (15.9% and 10%,
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respectively), but significant differences between error categories were found between
the AS group and the control group in attribution of faux pas to internal psychological
states (emotions, sensations, etc.; 15.9% and 6.7%, respectively) and to malicious
intentions (9.8% and 0.7%, respectively).
Because the attribution/explanation question appeared to severely impact the rates
of impairment on the FP Composite score in the non-clinical sample used in the current
study, more research is needed to better understand the utility of this question, the types
of errors committed by community-dwelling older adults, and whether these errors are
related to ToM-specific deficits or can be attributed to variability in other cognitive
processes.

With regard to the latter, one study found that older adults were more likely

than middle-aged adults to make the fundamental attribution error (i.e. correspondence
bias), which is when internal, stable causes are used to explain another individual's
behavior and logical, situational factors are largely ignored (Follett & Hess, 2002). In
that study, middle-aged adults also made the fundamental attribution error (though at
lower rates than older adults), indicating that it is a relatively normal error throughout
adulthood. Complexity in cognitive operations was found to account for some of the
variance in the fundamental attribution error in both the middle-aged adult and older
adult groups, suggesting a role for general cognitive processes that could also account for
some ofthe variability on the explanation/attribution question in the current study. In a
conceptual paper, Andrews (2001) discussed the fundamental attribution error and ToM
research, suggesting that attribution processes rely on ToM abilities. What is unclear
from the current study is whether the poor performance of the current sample on the
explanation/ attribution question represents normal or abnormal functioning, whether it
can be attributed to general cognitive processes, and whether it indicates subtle, but
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meaningful differences in ToM. With these issues in mind, the results of the study in
relation to the two main hypotheses will be discussed.
ToM Does Not Predict Social Relations in Community-Dwelling Older Adults
ToM was not significantly associated with social relations in the current study.
As a group, the sample appeared to be socially active with good interpersonal
relationships, reporting high levels of function across the social relations measures, as
shown in Table 9. The sample reported having larger social networks than past samples
using the Convoy measure (Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987; Antonucci et aI., 2002).

For

example, a study published in 2002 (Antonucci et aI.) found that the average network size
for u.s. males was 6.82 individuals (SD

=

2.95) and for u.s. females was 7.07

individuals (SD = 2.92), while the current sample had an average network size above 20
(see Table 9). Informants' reports of participants' social functioning on the prSFS also
indicated good social functioning, but were more consistent with another sample of
community-dwelling older adults with which the measure was used in the past (Henry et
aI.,2009). The relatively high overall social functioning and low variability in social
relations observed in the current sample may have limited the results linking ToM with
social functioning.
The social relations construct was well-represented in the current study, as the
measures used were based on both informant report and self-report. Though the
measures represented different facets of social relations, the three self-report measures
demonstrated associations with one another, but not with the informant-based measure.
Although it is important to consider that individuals with deficits on ToM may not
accurately report their social functioning (Eslinger et aI., 2005), ToM was also not
associated with informant report, and the current study found that primary participants
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had relatively good awareness. However, the lack of association between the informantbased social functioning measure and the self-report social measures along with the
finding that the informants' reports of participants' memory functioning did not relate to
participants' actual memory scores on cognitive testing, suggests questionable accuracy
with regard to informants' ratings of participants' memory and possibly social
functioning. Thus, some ofthe social relations measures used in the current study may
be more valid than others.
ToM is considered a social-cognitive construct; such constructs refer to cognitive
processes that allow human beings to understand their social world and interact
effectively with others (Washburn et aI., 2003). Empirical support for the link between
ToM and social relations comes from the finding that ToM impairment is highly
prevalent in clinical samples with prominent social deficits but relatively intact
performance on traditional cognitive tests (Gregory et aI., 2002; Baron-Cohen et aI.,
1999).

While evidence directly linking measures of social relations to ToM is limited, a

few studies have found a significant relationship between the two constructs in clinical
samples (Frith et aI., 1994; Brune et aI., 2007, Bora et aI., 2006), in samples of normally
developing children (Eggum et aI., 2011, Watson et aI., 1999, & Astington & Jenkins,
1995), and in a sample of older nursing home residents (Washburn et aI., 2003). Thus,
research increasingly suggests a valid role for ToM in predicting social relationships and
behavior in some groups.
The current study did not find a significant association between ToM and multiple
measures of social relations in community-dwelling older adults, which is consistent with
Bailey et aI., 2008, who also did not find a direct connection between ToM (EYES) and
social functioning in community-dwelling older adults. Even the use of cut-scores to
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indicate ToM impairment did not significantly differentiate older adults with regard to
social network size, perceived social support, negative social exchanges, and social
functioning. Furthermore, although the sample size was not large, the correlations
between ToM and social relations variables were so small that the likelihood of Type II
error appears low. Thus, the current study is consistent with extant research suggesting
that existing ToM measures, which presumably should demonstrate an association with
social relations given their purported measurement of a social-cognitive construct, may
have limited validity and usefulness for predicting social functioning in communitydwelling older adults.
Cross-sectional associations between ToM and social relations may be more
discernible in clinical samples which demonstrate ToM-specific deficits. The common
factor across clinical studies that link ToM and social relations is evidence of different
underlying brain function compared to the average adult. For example, an fMRI study of
ToM found that high functioning patients with AS recruited different brain areas
compared to healthy controls when completing ToM tasks (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999).
Presumably, the brain areas impacted during child development and in clinical samples
include areas that are required for ToM-specific ability, such as the amygala and the
medial and orbital areas of the prefrontal cortex (Stuss et aI., 2001; Baron-Cohen et aI.,
1999). While the average older adult may perform more poorly on some ToM tests
compared to younger adults, the poor or impaired performance of some older adults may
be attributable to declines in general cognitive processes rather than a ToM-specific
deficit associated with damage to underlying brain areas necessary for ToM. Thus,
community-dwelling older adults may lack the ToM-specific deficits that appear to
impact social relationships in clinical samples. As a result, community-dwelling older
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adults' poor perfonnances on ToM tests may not predict problems in social functioning.
Future research should continue to focus on establishing links between ToM and social
relations in clinical samples of older adults that appear to have ToM-specific impainnent.
It is also possible that ToM ability may actually decline in nonnally aging

individuals, but in a less-pronounced manner than in clinical samples. At the same time,
social ability could be bolstered to some extent by intact general cognitive processes. For
example, AS patients have succeeded in identifying faux pas by applying well-learned
social rules, even though they ultimately exhibit more difficulty with attribution and
empathy compared to age-matched controls (Zalla et aI., 2009). In the current study,
ToM impainnent may be marking subtle declines in brain processes and associated social
functioning that are too subtle to be detected by these measures of social relations. Thus,
alternative methods of measuring the nuances of social behavior, such as observational
techniques, may be more likely to expose any subtle differences in social interactions
detected by the ToM measures. Moreover, longitudinal studies of how ToM changes
over time and whether it predicts future impainnent in social relations could help clarify
the validity of ToM tests for predicting social functioning in community-dwelling
samples of older adults.
A final conclusion that may be drawn from the social relations analyses in the
current study is that variability in social relations in most community-dwelling older
adults may be better explained by factors other than ToM ability.

For example, in the

current study, social relations variables were associated with measures of health,
depression, global cognitive functioning, memory, and working memory, and these
findings are consistent with findings from other studies (Barnes et aI., 2004a; Antonucci
et aI., 1997; Russell et aI., 1991; Seeman & Chen, 2002).
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Any future studies of ToM

and social relations in either clinical samples or community-dwelling older adults will
need to consider the role that these factors may play.
Associations Between ToM and Awareness Were Mixed
Awareness of ability level is important throughout the lifespan in order for an
individual to judge whether participation in activities is likely to be successful and safe.
Although clinical samples of older adults with dementing disorders may demonstrate
significant lack of awareness of their deficits, non-clinical samples have also been noted
to demonstrate problems with awareness (Neary et aI., 1998; Auchus et aI., 1994;
Graham et aI, 2005). Despite numerous studies, the clinical correlates of unawareness are
not well-defined (see reviews, Aalten et aI., 2005; Clare, 2004a). ToM and awareness
emerge at the same time during childhood and have been linked in patients with
schizophrenia (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994; Happe, 2003; Bora et aI., 2007; Langdon &
Ward, 2009). Empirical associations have not yet been established between Tom and
awareness in other clinical samples with notable deficits in both domains (e.g. patients
with fvFTD), though such links are strongly suggested by extant literature (Gregory et aI.,
2002; Neary et aI., 1998). ToM and awareness are also thought to share overlapping
neural substrates (Saxe et aI., 2006; Vogeley et aI., 2001), which suggests that damage to
brain areas that impact ToM performance may also impact awareness, even in
community-dwelling older adults without dementia.
The results from the current study indicated that the primary participants
demonstrated very good awareness on average (Table 11). Significant associations were
found between primary participant ratings of memory and working memory function and
actual performance on cognitive testing. Thus, evidence for impaired awareness was
lacking in the current sample. Importantly, the excellent accuracy of the primary
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participants in the current study differentiates them from clinical samples that
demonstrate overall poor awareness and greater variability on awareness measures
(Eslinger et aI, 2005; Williamson, 2010).

Although ToM impairment was noted in the

current study, the lack of impairment in awareness may have limited the results.
Similar to the discussion of social relations and ToM, clinical samples with noted
deficits in both ToM and awareness may be the most likely populations to establish links
between ToM and awareness. There are three main reasons why community-dwelling
older adults may demonstrate ToM impairment without accompanying awareness
deficits. First, ToM-specific deficits may be present, but ToM may not actually be
required for awareness. Second, ToM may be required for awareness, but poor
performance on ToM tests may reflect poor general cognitive functioning rather than
specific deficits in ToM in community-dwelling older adults. Third, ToM tests may be
detecting an underlying neurological process that has not yet impacted awareness, but
will impact awareness in the future as the underlying changes progress. Continued
research into the correlates of awareness as well as longitudinal study of ToM tests and
awareness in community-dwelling older adults will help to clarify the relationship
between these two constructs.
The current study hypothesized that individuals performing more poorly on ToM
tests would be more likely to overestimate their cognitive and social abilities, but very
limited support was found for the hypothesis. The extant literature suggests that
overestimation of abilities is more common in older adult clinical samples that
demonstrate ToM-specific deficits and also may be more clinically relevant with regard
to safety and caregiver distress (Banks & Weintraub, 2008; Souchay et aI., 2003; Rankin
et aI., 2005, Rymer et aI., 2002). In the current study, ToM impairment (FP
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REJECTIONS) approached significance (p = .052) with regard to its ability to predict
online-monitoring of memory performance (HVL T-R Postdiction Awareness), with the
impaired group overestimating their performance compared to the non-impaired group.
Postdiction measures of awareness are thought to tap online monitoring ability.
The fact that a postdiction measure of awareness came closest to demonstrating the
hypothesized relationship between ToM and awareness in the current study is important
in the context of mounting evidence that postdiction measures have been found to
demonstrate the greatest utility in capturing the gross awareness deficits exhibited by
patients with fvFTD (Eslinger et aI., 2005; O'Keeffe et aI., 2007). O'Keeffe and
associates (2007) found that patients with FTD demonstrated significantly less
adjustment in their ratings following performance compared to other clinical older adult
groups (corticobasal degeneration, progressive supranuclear palsy), though all groups
demonstrated unawareness on some measures compared to controls. Additionally, while
patients with AD may demonstrate unawareness, they appear to adjust their postdiction
ratings according to their actual performance (Stewart et aI., 2010). For example, one
study found that participants with AD overestimated their performance on a cognitive
task before the task and 1 hour after the task, but were able to provide accurate estimates
immediately after the task, consistent with intact online monitoring (Stewart et aI., 2010).
Evidence that patients with fvFTD may demonstrate greater difficulties with online
monitoring compared to other clinically impaired older adults groups combined with the
current findings (i.e., association between online monitoring of memory awareness and
ToM) suggests that future research should focus on possible associations between ToM
and online monitoring measures of awareness.

70

Although poorer ToM performance was expected to predict overestimation, the
results ofthe current study surprisingly indicated that ToM also predicted
underestimation. Two significant associations were found that suggested that poorer
ToM ability was associated with underestimation of memory and working memory. This
finding is based on two different types of awareness measurement: an informant-based
measure of awareness (MARS-MFS Awareness) and a performance-based measure of
awareness (LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness).
While extant studies have not suggested that lower levels of ToM ability should
be associated with underestimation, healthy controls have been found to underestimate
their positive qualities (Rankin, 2005). Other studies have found that cognitive
complaints or underestimation of performance were related to mood and general mental
health factors (Okonkwo et aI., 2008; Cargin et aI., 2008), though no evidence was found
for this in the current sample, which may be related to the relatively low rates of
depressive symptoms.
One problem in drawing the conclusion that ToM may predict underestimation in
older adults is that much of the evidence relies on informant-based ratings of awareness,
which may have dubious accuracy. In the current study, the informants' ratings of
primary participants' memory abilities were not significantly correlated with primary
participants' actual performance on cognitive testing, but the primary participants' selfratings of memory were significantly correlated with actual memory performance. This
suggests that the primary participants may have provided more accurate estimates than
the informants on the MARS-MFS awareness measure. This would imply that the
negative discrepancy scores that were obtained between informants' ratings and primary
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participants' ratings were produced by informants' overestimating primary participants'
memory ability.
Problems with the accuracy of informant reports have been noted across the
awareness literature (see review, Clare, 2004; Okwonko et aI., 2008). For example, in a
study of financial capacity comparing patients with Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI)
and healthy controls, 31.9% of the MCI patients' informants overestimated the patients'
ability (Okwonko et aI., 2008). Research has suggested that accuracy of informant
ratings may depend on whether the informant resides with the primary participant, the
type of relationship between the informant and primary participant, the informant's
cognitive ability, and how disturbed the informant is by primary participant behavior
(Clare, 2004; Ready, 2004). In the current study, primary participants and informants
knew one another for a long time and saw one another frequently, but only 27.3% of the
primary participants and informants lived together. Thus, it is possible that poor
informant accuracy in the current study may be related to inadequate proximity or
frequency of contact with informants and that very close proximity is necessary for
accurate informant ratings in community-dwelling older adults. The need for proximity
may be more important with community-dwelling older adults compared to clinical
samples because community-dwelling older adults are typically not impaired and any
cognitive difficulties that they exhibit on testing or in their daily lives may be more subtle
and related to other factors (i.e. illness, fatigue, depression, etc.). Future studies of
awareness may demonstrate better accuracy in informant ratings by limiting who can
serve in the informant role and by including factors such as informant cognitive
functioning and disturbance measures into study designs. Additionally, more research
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regarding what factors contribute to informant accuracy would likely help both clinicians
and researchers.
The findings regarding underestimation and ToM also appeared to be influenced
by ethnicity, as the association between memory awareness (MARS-MFS Awareness)
and the FP Composite score was no longer significant when African-American and
Hispanic participants were removed from the analysis. While the loss of statistical
significance may be attributable to a loss of power resulting from the decreased sample
size, the role of ethnicity is highlighted by the finding that the association of
underestimation of working memory and poorer ToM performance was only significant
when the African-American and Hispanic participants were removed from the analysis.
As ethnicity was only associated with the FP Composite and was not associated with
either of the awareness variables, it is likely that the changes in the significant
associations may be related to variability in the Faux Pas Test that is associated with
ethnicity, which will be discussed further below.

Clinical Application a/ToM Tests
In general, more normative data is needed if ToM tests are to be used for clinical
purposes. The finding of impairment on the ToM measures in this community sample is
particularly relevant in that both of the ToM measures included in the current study have
been recommended as part of a larger neuropsychological testing battery for detecting
executive and social deficits in early frontotemporal dementia (Torralva et aI., 2009).
The clinical research essentially suggests that healthy patients will perform at ceiling or
at least consistently above impairment levels on ToM measures, but this was not the case
in this relatively high functioning community sample of older adults.
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As noted above, the lack of strong support for the hypotheses regarding ToM,
awareness, and social functioning may be related to a lack of ToM-specific impairment in
community-dwelling older adults or confounds introduced by variability in general
cognitive processes. An absence of ToM-specific impairment in community-dwelling
older adults may suggest that ToM as a construct has limited validity and usefulness for
predicting social functioning and awareness in this population. As noted in the
introduction to this paper, the phenomenon of poorer ToM performance in communitydwelling older adults compared to younger adults has been attributed by some authors to
problems with general cognitive processes, such as memory and executive functioning,
rather than a specific deficit in ToM (McKinnon & Moscovich, 2007; German &
Hehman, 2006). The current study provides mixed support regarding the role of general
cognitive processes with ToM, as the EYES test was highly correlated with cognitive
measures but the Faux Pas Test was not. However, when impairment across the Faux Pas
indices was considered, the impaired group demonstrated significantly lower levels of
frontal lobe functioning and estimates of verbal IQ, suggesting that these factors likely
contributed to impaired scores in some participants. The results suggest that general
cognitive processes were likely involved in impairment on both ToM measures in the
current study. Thus, future research is needed to ascertain the contribution of general
cognitive processes in older adult ToM performance on advanced ToM measures and to
guide improvements to ToM tests in order to increase specificity for ToM impairment.

A final issue that relates to using ToM measures in clinical work with older
adults regards the association between ethnicity and the Faux Pas Test. AfricanAmericans in the current sample were overrepresented in the impairment category on the
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Faux Pas Composite score, with 80% of African-Americans performing in the impaired
range compared to 27.7% of Non-Hispanic Whites performing in the impaired range.
This may be because Faux Pas performance was associated with the lower ratings of
health, slightly lower verbal IQ scores (approached significance), or lower levels of
education (approached significance) in the African-American group compared to the nonHispanic White group. Although there is very little literature about African-American
performance on ToM tests, one study of low-income preschoolers found that European
children outperformed African-American children on ToM tests (Curenton, 2004). This
may reflect cultural differences, as what is considered a faux pas may vary across
cultures, and explanations of faux pas may vary according to ethnic groups' sociocultural
histories. This may reflect a bias in ToM tests toward European cultural norms. Studies
with the Faux Pas Test in older adults have generally either not included AfricanAmericans or have not reported the ethnicities of their participants (MacPherson et aI.,
2002; Stone et aI., 1998; Gregory et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI., 2007; Torralva et aI., 2009).
In recognition of the importance of providing participants with culturally appropriate

stimuli, Wang et aI. (2006) modified the stories in the Faux Pas Test for use with Chinese
participants.

Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations and future directions for research have already been discussed,
but there are others that must be noted. First, the sample was healthy, relatively
financially well-off, and more educated than the general population (United States
Census Bureau, 2011). These factors were relevant for several reasons. Lower vascular
risk predicts lower rates of small vessel brain disease and other damage to neural circuitry
(Knopman et aI., 2011), higher levels of education are believed to increase cognitive
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reserve (see review, Stem, 2002), and greater income may increase access to resources
associated with better health (Ettner, 1996). Essentially, factors such as health, income,
and education, which may impact underlying neural integrity, may have resulted in the
current sample having better cognitive and social functioning compared to the majority of
their same-age peers. Thus, the sample characteristics in the current study may impact
the generalizability of the results. As discussed above, however, the finding of impaired
performance on ToM measures is particularly relevant within the context of the sample's
good health and general cognitive functioning.
Although an effort was made to recruit a representative sample, lower income
participants were less likely to participate. This may be related to general difficulties in
recruiting some groups to participate in research, but also may have been related to the
combination of the volunteer-basis of study participation, the need for an informant, and
the relatively significant time commitment for participation. In the current study, the
latter two issues were necessary in order to answer study questions, but future studies
would likely benefit by paying participants for their time.
The method that was used to compute awareness on the performance-based
measures (HVLT-R and LN-Seq Prediction & Postdiction awareness measures) was
similar to the method used in an existing study (Graham et ai., 2005), but collapsing the
actual scores into broad ranges based on standard deviations may have contributed to a
loss of critical variability in the awareness scores. In a methodological improvement in
the awareness literature, Williamson et ai. (2010) provided brief education on normative
distributions and percentiles to three groups: participants with frontotemporal dementia,
participants with AD, and healthy controls. A graphic depiction of the normal curve,
which depicted human figures, was presented to participants to use in providing estimates
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of their functioning in different domains. Participants' estimates were then easily
converted into percentile scores, and the difference between the actual performance
percentile and the estimated percentile could be calculated. Notably, the percentile
estimates were highly correlated with a verbal rating scale (poor, fair, good, etc.) similar
to the scale used in the current study, which suggested that the percentile method was just
as good as the verbal rating scales with regard to reliability of estimates. While more
research is needed to further validate the percentile-estimate method, it appears
promising, as it may increase the precision of awareness measurement without the
dampening of variability that occurs when actual performance scores are collapsed into
ranges.
As noted above, awareness and ToM present measurement challenges, and there
are other measures of these constructs available to researchers. Although the selected
measures for the current study were chosen based on the strength of their empirical
support, it is possible that other measures of these constructs would demonstrate the
hypothesized results because other measures of these constructs may tap more relevant
aspects or may have better clinical utility in older adults. Thus, future studies of ToM
and awareness may wish to incorporate alternative measures of the constructs.
Both Type I and Type II error must be considered with regard to interpreting
results from the current study. With regard to Type I error, analyses in the current study
involved multiple comparisons, but maintained an alpha level at .05. The choice to
maintain alpha at .05 was based on the need to balance factors associated with Type I and
Type II error, as well as a consideration of the relative novelty of the research. However,
because of the high number of comparisons in the current study, there is a possibility that
some of the significant associations were products of Type I error. Thus, replication of
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the results will be important for establishing the reliability of the findings. Consideration
of Type II error is particularly germane to the analyses of ToM and awareness, as the
current study may have lacked power to detect differences as a result of the modest
sample size.

The suggested sample size based on power analyses combined with the

finding of borderline significant correlations between ToM and awareness indicate that
the study sample was likely too small to detect moderate effects. Slightly larger sample
sizes may be necessary to detect potential associations between awareness and ToM in
future studies.
Although excellent interrater reliability was found on the Faux Pas Test, one
possible explanation for the lower scores among the two questions related to faux pas
understanding is that the raters were more strict than other researchers in their scoring of
these questions.

The scoring guidance available in the testing manual and throughout

the literature appears slightly mixed and may indicate that researchers have approached
Faux Pas Test scoring with varying degrees of adherence to the manual (Stone et aI.,
1998; Gregory et aI., 2002; Zalla et aI., 2009, MacPherson et aI., 2002; Torralva et aI.,
2007). Certainly, better standardization with regard to scoring the Faux Pas Test as well
as better normative data for both EYES and the Faux Pas Test is required in order to meet
clinical standards.
In sum, the current study did not find a significant relationship between ToM and
social relations and only found limited support for a relationship between ToM and
awareness in community-dwelling older adults. As discussed above, the findings may
have been impacted by confounds from general cognitive processes, limitations of the
measures, and sample characteristics. Increased specificity of ToM measurement along
with the establishment of normative data and standardized scoring criteria for ToM
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measures will likely improve future studies involving ToM. Refinement of awareness
measurement, observational measurement of social functioning, replication with larger
samples, research in clinical samples, and research into the longitudinal relationship of
ToM, awareness, and social functioning may clarify any relationship between the three
constructs.
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Table I
Study (First author, yearl
Happe et aI., 1998

N(mean ag_e in years)
OA: 19 (9 men, 10 women;
mean age = 73}

ToM Test(&
Strange Stories Test

Other Tests

Main Results
Interaction of age and story
type (control & ToM) F(I,
82) = 14.59, P < .001.
Post-hoc comparisons
reveal OA performed
better on ToM stories than
YA t(84) =4.18, p<.OOI.

Strange Stories; Oroodles;
Spy Model Task; Knower/
Guesser Task

Executive measures

I) OA group and YA
group had similar
performance on all ToM
tasks, with the exception of
the Knower/Guesser task,
on which the OA group
performed significantly
below the YA group (t(9)
= -2.330, p= .022). 2) The
Knower/Guesser task was
the most highly correlated
with measures of executive
functioning.

YA: 67 (33 men, 34
women) (mean age = 21)

Saltzman et aI., 2000*

OA: 8 (3 male, 5 female;
mean age = 71.61, SO =
9.42)
Y A: 9 (3 male, 6 female;
mean age = 20.87, SO =
2.53)

Limits
I) Older group had high
education 12-18 years (m=
14 years, 7 months) which
may affect the
generalizability of the
results. 2) No measure of
general intelligence. 3)
Scores may have been
confounded with memory
as participants were not
permitted to review
vignettes.
I) Small sample size. 2)
The one measure that
found age differences may
rely heavily on executive
functioning. 3) the other
measures used
demonstrated ceiling
effects.

N

o
.-

Study (First author, year)
Maylor, 2002
Experiment I

N (mean age in years)
VA: 25 (15 males, 10
females; mean age = 19,
SD = 3.7)

ToM Test(s)
Strange Stories + 3 new
stories

Other Tests
Speed, Vocabulary
Intelligence measures

YOA: 25 (9 males, 16
females; mean age = 67.2,
SD = 4.8)
OOA: 25 (6 males, 19
females; mean age = 81,
SD = 3.3)

Maylor, 2002 Experiment
2

VA: 30 (14 males, 16
females; mean age = 21.2,
SD = 2.5)
OA: 30 (13 males, 17
females; mean age = 80.6,
SD = 4.7)

Strange Stories - no
memory load

Vocabulary
Speed;
Executive function
measures

Main Results
I) ANOV A found
significant differences on
ToM tasks with no
memory load regarding
age group (F(2, 72) =
21.21, p<.OOO I). Post hoc
comparisons revealed that
Y A & YOA performed
better on ToM tasks
without a memory load
than the OOA.
2) ANOV A on ToM with
memory load was
significant F(2,72) = 9.52,
P < .0005). Post hoc
comparisons revealed that
Y A performed better on
tasks with a memory load
than both OOA & YOA.
I) Relationship between
ToM and executive
functioning was mediated
by age. Relationship
disappeared when age was
partialled out. 2)
ANCOV A using
education, vocabulary,
speed, executive
functioning as covariates
found an interaction
between story type (control
vs. ToM) and age: F(I,53)
= 4.23, p<.05. 3)
Crystallized ability
markers, such as education
and vocabulary, predicted
ToM performance.

Limits
I) Use of stimuli that have
not been validated.
2) Control tasks may differ
from ToM tasks regarding
inference complexity.

I) Only one measure of
ToM was used. 2) Control
tasks may differ from ToM
tasks regarding inference
complexity.

i

r')

o

Study (First author, year)
MacPherson, 2002

N (mean age in years)
VA: 30 (15 men, 15
women; mean age = 50.3,
SD = 5.7)

ToM Test(s)
Faux Pas Task

Other Tests
Executive tasks; Gambling
task, Emotion
Identification task;
memory tasks.

MA: 30 (15 men, 15
women; mean age = 50.3,
SD = 5.7)

VA: 30 (II men, 19
women; mean age = 29.9,
SD = 7.1)

Limits
I) Only one ToM task was
used.

Age effect was found for
emotion identification, but
this effect disappeared
when memory ability was
used as a covariate.

OA: 30 (15 men, 15
women; mean age = 69.9,
SD = 5.5)
Phillips, MacLean, &
Allen, 2002

Main Results
The ToM task did not
demonstrate age effects
(MANCOVA, Wilk's A =
.86, F(10,162) = 1.26, TJp2
= .07.07.

Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Task

Measures of fluid and
crystallized intelligence,
Empathy, Emotion
Identification tasks

OA: 30 (15 men, 15
women; mean age = 69.2,
SD = 6.1)

YA performed
significantly better on the
ToM task after controlling
for education and fluid and
crystallized intelligence
(F(I ,55) = 5.61, p< .05, TJ p2
= .09).

I) Only one ToM measure
was used. 2) Performance
on this task may rely on
visuospatial processes
which may decline with
age.
~

o
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004

VA: 24 (13M, IIW; mean
age = 30, SD = 7.5)

Strange Stories;
Video Task

Measures of fluid and
crystallized intelligence.

OA: 24 (8M, 16W; mean
age = 73 years, SD = 6.0)

'------

----

I) YA performed
significantly better than
older adults on ToM
stories (t(46) = 4.56,
p<.OOI). 2) The effect of
age x story type (ToM vs.
control) disappeared when
fluid abilities were
controlled for F(I ,45) =
2.49, p = .12.

--

--

I) Group differences on
control stories almost
significant t(46) = 1.82,
p<.08. Thus, with more
power differences may be
found, which would then
indicate that older adults
would demonstrate an age
effect for both control and
ToM conditions, and not
just ToM. 2) Sample was
primarily white, middle
class, limiting
generalizability.

Study (First author, year)
German & Hehman, 2006

N (mean age in years)
YA: 27 (9M 18F; mean
age = 19.51,SD=1.5I)
OA: 20 (1M, 19F; mean
age = 78.22, SD = 8.27)

Wang & Su, 2006

YA: 30 (26M, 4F; mean
age = 69.93, SD = 3.73)
OA: 30 (26M, 4F; mean
age = 21.6, SD = 1.5)

ToM Test(s)
New vignettes were
created in which ToM and
the control condition were
more evenly matched.

Strange Stories;
Faux Pas stories(1 from
Stone et al. 2003,2 newly
constructed)

Other Tests
Crystallized and fluid
intelligence measures;
executive function
measures focusing on
response inhibition

Main Results
Performance on ToM tasks
was not significantly
different in Y A vs. OA
groups F(I ,45) = 0.66,
p>.05.

Crystallized and fluid
intelligence measures; IQ

OA demonstrated worse
performance on the Faux
Pas test than Y A (t(58) = 2.25, p<.05, but no
differences were found
between the older and
younger groups on the
Strange stories.

Limits
I ) The measures used were
created and were not
piloted. Though they
seemed to be
improvement, more studies
would be needed to
determine their reliability
and validity.
2) Gender differences on
the tasks would influence
the generalizability of
results.
I) Cultural norms (study
was done in China. 2)
Possibly invalid measures
3) Memory may be
confounded with
performance as
participants were not
allowed to refer back to
stories before answering
questions. 4) Men may
perform more poorly on
ToM tasks than women,
which would affect the
generalizability of the
results.

I
I

I

I

I

V)

o

Study (First author, year)
Uekermann, Channon, &
Daum,2006

N (mean age in years)
YA: 32 (12M, 10F; mean
age = 24.15 , SO = 0.73).

ToM Test(s)
Joke Task

Other Tests
Abbreviated TQ measures,
Depression, Executive
measures

Main Results
ANOVA demonstrated
significant difference in
ToM performance across
groups (F(2,84) = 14.22,
p< .000 I). Post hoc
analyses demonstrated that
the older adults group
performed significantly
worse on ToM tasks
compared to both the YA
and MA groups.

Limits
Possible cohort effects and
clear ceiling effects for
humor processing task.

Strange Stories
Single Cartoon Task

Global Cognitive
functioning, Vocabulary,
working memory, fluency,
selective attention and
inhibition, sequencing &
visual search, memory,
personality, emotion
processing of faces and
words, trait measures

OA and Y A did not
demonstrate ToM- specific
differences on either ToM
task, though they did
perform more poorly on
comprehension questions
compared to YA.

Only 8 ToM items were
used (4 ToM cartoons, 4
ToM stories) and a
relatively small sample
size was used. Both of
these may have limited
power to detect
differences.

MA: 29 (10 M, 19 F; mean
age = 49 , SO = 0.96)
OA: 26 (12M, 14F; mean
age = 67.46, SO = 1.26)

Keightley et a!., 2006

YA: 30 (15M, 15F; mean
age = 25.7, SO = 5.1)
OA: 30 (15M, 15F; mean
age = 72.5, SO = 7.8)

Performance on ToM tasks
was not predicted by
personality in either young
or old adults (Keightley et
a!., 2006)

\0

o
..-.

Study (First author, year)
McKinnon & Moscovitch,
2007

N (mean age in years)
Y A: 12 (gender NI A;
mean age = 78.18, SD =
N/A)

ToM Test(s)
Vignettes including faux
pas, first-order ToM
questions, and secondorder ToM questions.

Other Tests
Deontic selection task;
working memory tasks

OA: 12 (genderN/A; mean
age = 20.16, SD = N/A)

Main Results
OA performed worse than
YA only on second-order
questions (F (I, II) = 1.96,
p>.05), but not on firstorder questions (F (I, I J) =
1.96, p>.05).
Working memory supports
ToM functioning.

Slessor, 2007

OA: 40 (15 male, 25
female; mean age = 66.95,
SD = 4.31)

Strange Stories;
Videos Task;
Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Task

Mill Hill Vocabulary Test

YA: 40 (12 male, 28
female; mean age = 20.08,
SD = 4.64)

-----

Age differences on verbal
ToM for Strange Stories
task: ANOVA
demonstrated no effects of
age on ToM F(I ,78)<1, TJ p2
= .00.
ANCOVA (controlling for
vocabulary) on verbal
ToM demonstrated effects
of age: F(I, 77) = 11.24,
p<.OI.

-------

-

--

---

---

Age differences were
found for the visual tasks,
but not between the ToM
and control tasks. Across
visual tasks, both age
groups performed better on
the ToM tasks than on the
control tasks.

Limits
High education in OA
group (M = 15.90 years of
education)
Created their own
vignettes based on faux pas
stories and strange stories.
No non-ToM control
condition, so the
conclusion cannot be
drawn that the deficits
observed are specific ToM
deficits; rather, they may
be working memory
deficits.
OAs had superior
vocabulary compared to
YAs.
Did not control for
executive functioning.
Control condition for
visual tasks was to guess
the age range of characters
(40-50 years vs. 50-60
years). This may not be a
well-matched control
condition.

tO

Study (First author, year)
Bailey, 2008

N (mean age in years)
OA: 49 (16 male, 33
female; mean age = 70.4,
SD = 5.51)
YA: 80 (23 male, 57
female; mean age = 20.8,
SD = 1.13)

ToM Test(s)
Eyes task

Other Tests
EQ (Empathy Quotient)
Questionnaire
Pro social subscale of the
Social Functioning Scale.

Main Results
OA performed worse than
Y A on EYES task t(l27) =
7.61, d= 1.35)

Limits
Causality cannot be
determined due to crosssectional design.

OA reported lower levels
of cognitive empathy (but
not affective empathy)
compared to YA (t(127) =
2.45, d= 0.44)
OA reported lower levels
of social participation
compared to YA (t (127) =
3.48, d= .62)
Cognitive empathy (as
measured by EQ) partially
mediated relationship
between age and social
functioning. EYES did not
demonstrate mediation
between age and social
functioning.

00

o

Analysis of EYES test
determined no difference
in performance for OA vs.
Y A on items of different
emotional valence.
Authors conclude age is
associated with reduced
capacity for cognitive
empathy, but not affective
empathy.
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Study (First author, year)
Bailey & Henry, 2008

Other Tests
Speed, memory, measures
of inhibitory control
(Stroop test, Hayling
Sentence Completion Test)

Main Results
OA performed worse on
EYES test compared to
YA t(67) = -4.38, d = 1.04)

N (mean age in years)
OA: 33 (J I male, 22
female); mean age = 72.2,
SD = 5.56)

ToM Test(s)
Reality-known video task
(high inhibition of selfperspective FB task)

VA: 36 (II male, 25
female; mean age = 19.5,
SD = 2.\0)

Reality Unknown video
task (low inhibition FB
task)

OA performed worse than
YA on high inhibition FB
task

EYES task

OA demonstrated worse
performance on high
inhibition FB task
compared to their
performance on low
inhibition FB task, while
YA demonstrated no
differences in performance
on the two tasks.
Stroop task, but not
Hayling task, mediated age
and performance on highinhibition FB task.
Hayling task, but not
Stroop task, mediated age
and performance on the
Eyes task.

Limits
Cross-sectional limits
causality.

0\

o
I

I

I

Study (First author, year)
Pardini, 2009

N (mean age in years)
YA (Young Adults): 30
(15 male, 15 female); Age
range = 20-25 years

ToM Test(s).
Revised Eyes Test

Other Tests
Inclusion criteria: MMSE
> 27 and no errors on
CLOX test.

EMA (Early Middle Age)
30 (15 male, 15 female);
Age range = 45 - 55 years
LMA (Late Middle Age)
30 (16 males, 14 females);
Age range = 55- 65 years

OA: N= 20 (8M,12F;
mean age = 82, education
level = 15 y)

Limits
No other variables known
to influence ToM were
used as controls.

4 contrasts indicated
poorer performance on
EYES test for each older
group:

Cross-sectional study;
cohort effects could be
influencing data.

YA>LMA
Y A> older adults
EMA>LMA
LMA>older adults

OA (Old Age) 30 (13
males, 17 females); Age
range = 70-75 years
Verdon, 2007

Main Results
Significant age differences
were found for ToM (F(3,
116) = 24.5

Cartoon Task

MMSE; Verbal Memory
Task

Y A: N=20 (9M, II F)
mean age = 27, education
16 y)

OA = Older adults
Y A = Younger Adults
YOA = Young-old adults
OOA = Old old adults
WCST = Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
* Also included an additional group of 11 patients with Parkinson's disease; not reported in this table.
**Also included an additional group of20 patients with Alzheimer's disease; not reported in this table.

Performance on ToM tasks
was not significantly
different in YA vs. OA
groups.

I) Expressive language
abilities were not tested,
but are an important
element of test
performance on the
cartoon task used. 3)
Depression, anxiety, and
psychotic disorders were
excluded. Exclusions may
limit the generalizability of
the results.

o
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Table 2.

Effect sizes regarding ToM and different social variables
Sample characteristics &
reference

Social Construct( s)

Effect Size

N

Schizophrenia
(Bora et aI., 2006)

Overall Social Functioning
Interpersonal Communication

r= .46
r= .49

50

Schizophrenia
(Brune et aI., 2007)

Problematic Social Behaviors

r = -.69

38

College Students
(Baron-Cohen et aI.,
2001)

social skills
communicative abilities

r= .27
r= .25

103

6-year-old children,
normally developing
(Watson et aI., 1999)

Social skills as rated by
teachers

r= .35

26

Table 3
---.J;;;;L

Meaning of HIGHER
TRANSFORMED scores for
subsequent analyses

Abbreviation/Label
AD
ADLs
AS
CMI

Full Name/Description
Alzheimer's disease
Activities of daily living
Asperger's Syndrome
Charlson Comorbidity Index

Convoy
DRS-2
EYES
FAB
FP Composite
FP HITS

Convoy Measure
Larger social networks f
Dementia Rating Scale - Version 2
Lower ToM abilitya, e, f
Reading the Eyes in the Mind Test-Revised
Frontal Assessment Battery
Poorer frontal lobe functioning a, f
Lower ToM abilitl' e, f
Faux Pas Test Composite
Faux Pas Test Hits (correctly identifying a story with a
faux pas as containing a faux pas)
Faux Pas Test Rejections (correctly identifying stories
without a faux pas as not containing a faux pas)
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
Frontal variant frontotemporal dementia
More depressive symptomsb,d, g
Geriatric Depression Scale
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test - Revised
Discrepancy between predicted performance on the
HVLT -R and actual performance

FP REJECTIONS
fMRI
fvFTD
GDS
HVLT-R
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness

Lower levels of medical
comorbidityb, h

-_._-

-

N

Abbreviation/Label
Full Name/Description
HVL T -R Postdiction Awareness Discrepancy between postdicted performance on the
HVLT -R and actual performance
HVL T -R Delayed Recall
Hopkins Verbal Learning Test - Revised, Delayed
Recall
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living
IADLs
ISEL
Interpersonal Support Evaluation List-Short Form

Meaning of HIGHER
TRANSFORMED scores for
subsequent analyses

Poorer memorl' f

Lower level of social supporta, g

LN-Seq
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness

Letter-Number Sequencing subtest
Discrepancy between predicted performance on LNSeq and actual performance
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness Discrepancy between postdicted performance on LNSeq and actual performance
MARS-MFS
Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory Awareness
Rating Scale - Revised.
MARS-MFS Awareness
Discrepancy between informant and primary participant
ratings of primary participant memory on the MARSMFS
MARS-MFS Informant Ratings Informant Ratings of Primary Participant's memory on Lower levels of memory in the
primary participanta, f
the MARS-MFS
MARS-MFS Primary
Memory Functioning Scale of the Memory Awareness
Participant Ratings
Rating Scale - Revised, Primary participants' selfreport of memory
Mild Cognitive Impairment
Mel
North American Adult Reading Test
NAART
-

---

--

--

-

M

Abbreviation/Label
PANSE-NSE
PD
PP
prSFS

Full Name/Description
Positive and Negative Social Exchange measure Negative Social Exchange subscale
Parkinson's disease
Primary Participant
Peer Report Social Functioning Scale - the informant
ratings of primary participant social functioning

Meaning of HIGHER
TRANSFORMED scores for
subsequent analyses
Greater frequency of negative social
exchanges f

Lower levels of social functioning a,
f

Discrepancy between primary participant & Informant Lower levels of awareness &
ratings of primary participant social functioning on the overestimation of social
functioningb, f
Peer Report Social Functioning Scale
prSFS primary participant
Primary participant's self-report of their social
functioning on the Peer Report Social Functioning
rating
Scale
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory
SST
Theory of Mind
ToM
Vascular Risk
Higher levels of vascular riskb,f
Vascular Risk
Visual Acuity
Bett~r visual acuitl,h
Visual Acuity
a Required a preliminary linear transformation to reverse skew from negative to positive.
bRequired a preliminary linear transformation to make all scores positive.
c 100% correct group versus less than 100% correct group.
dtranformation completed on both primary participant and informant scores
eNote that the raw score, in which higher scores indicate better ToM, was usedfor comparison with extant studies
j Square Root transformation
gNatural Log transformation
hReciprocal transformation
prSFS awareness score

---

----

--
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Table 4
Characteristics of Primary Participants and Informants

Characteristic

Primary Participants

Informants

Age (years)

Mean = 68.79 (SO = 7.75)

Mean = 59.33
(SO = 15.77t

Gender
Male
Female

23 (29.5%)
55 (70.5)

18(23.1%)
59 (75.6%)

Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White
African American
Hispanic

72 (92.3%)
5 (6.4%)
1 (l.3%)

69 (88.5%)
6 (7.7%)
2 (2.6%)

1 (l.3%)
6 (7.7%)
27 (34.6%)

3 (3.9%)b
8 (10.4%)
25 (32.5%)

16 (20.5%)
28 (35.9%)

21 (27.3%)
20 (26.0%)

Marital Status
Married/Partnered
Not Married

34 (43.6%)
44 (56.4%)

36 (47.4%t
40 (52.6%)

Employment Status
Employed
Retired/Unemployed

31 (39.8%)
47 (60.2%)

40 (52.0%)b
37 (48.0%)

12 (17.9%)C
27 (40.3%)
28 (4l.8%)

10 (15.2%)d
29 (43.9%)
27 (40.9%)

9 (1l.5%)
69 (88.5%)

9 (1l.8%)a
67 (88.2%)

Education
Less than 12th grade
High School graduate (or GED)
Partial College/Specialized
Training
College Graduate
Graduate Training

Income
<$20,000
$20,000-$59,999
~$60,000

Health Self-Rating
Poor or Fair
Good, Very Good, or Excellent

aData available for 76 informants; bData available for 77 informants;
CData available for 67 primary participants; dData available for 66 informants

115

Table 5

Cognitive variables - Means and 95% confidence intervals (or standard deviations)

Construct

Measure

n

Mean
107.88C

Standard
Deviation a
10.49

95% Confidence
Interval
105.51 - 110.24

VerbalIQ

NAART C

78

Global Cognitive Functioning

DRS-2 Total Scaled
Scoree

77

11.17e

2.41

10.62 - 11.72

(DRS-2 Total raw
score)

77

138.44

4.99

137.31-139.57

52.92 - 57.97

57.16 - 61.43

\0

Memory

HVLT -R Delayed
Recall T -Scored

76

55.57 d

Frontal lobe functioning

FAB Total T-Scored

78

59.43 d

Letter-Number
77
Sequencing Total TScored
aNot reportedfor transformed variables
bBased on transformed score
cStandard Score (mean = 100, standard deviation = 15)
dr-score (mean = 50, standard deviation = 10)
eScaled Score (mean = 10, standard deviation = 3)

Working Memory

55.99 d

9.27

53.88 - 58.09

Table 6
Characteristics Regarding the Relationships of Primary Participants and Informants a
Characteristic

n (%)

Informants Roles/Relationships with
Primary Participants
Spouse
Friend/Sibling
Child/Child-in-Iaw
Other

20 (26.0%)
33 (42.9%)
16 (20.8%)
8 (10.4%)
30.19 (19.22)

Duration of the Informants' Relationship
with Primary Participants in years
Frequency of Informants seeing/talking
with Primary Participants
Lives with Primary Participant
Daily
Several Times per Week
Once a week - monthly
aData

available for 77 pairs
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Mean (SD)

21 (27.3%)
23 (29.9%)
24 (31.2%)
9 (11.7%)

Table 7

EYES Test - Mean EYES Test scores in Recent Studies with older adults
Study

n

Mean age (SD)

Mean

Current Study

78

68.8 (7.75)

25.95

78

68.8 (7.75)

25.41

4.7

Bailey et al., 2008

49

70.4 (5.5)

21.2

6.3

Bailey & Henry, 2008

33

72.2 (5.6)

23.4

3.8

Pardini et aI., 2009 b

30

b

21.6

2.2

(non-transformed

Standard
Deviation a

95%
Confidence
Interval
24.8. 26.9

data)

aNot

reported for transformed variables
bparticipants' ages rangedfrom 70-75 years

00

Table 8

Faux Pas Test Composite, FP HITS, and FP REJECTIONS scores in recent studies with older adults without clinical diagnosis

Study

n

Mean age
(SD)

Measure

Mean (SD a)

95%
Confidence
Interval

Current Study

78

68.8 (7.75)

FP Composite
Score
FP Composite
Score
Proportionb

33.3

32.4 - 34.1

0.82 (0.09)

0.80 -0.84

FP HITS
Proportion

0.96 (0.08)
FP
REJECTIONS
Proportion

Gregory et aI.,

10

57.1 (5.1t

2002

FP Composite
Score Proportion

0.94 (0.1)
FP HITS
Proportion

0.95 (0.1)
FP
REJECTIONS
Proportion

Torralva et aI.,
2007

10

63.5 (5.8)

0.94 (.1)

FP HITS
Score

0.99 (0.1)

9.3 (0.9)d

9.7 (0.5)d
FP
REJECTIONS
Score
aNot reported for transformed variables, bProportion score calculated in order to make comparisons with other studies, C Based on
16 participants, although only 10 participated in Faux Pas Testing ;dMaximum possible score was 10 (as there are 10 stories)

0"1
......
......

Table 9.
Social Relations variables - Means and 95% confidence intervals

Possible
n
Score
Range
Theoretically 77
Infinite

a Mean-

95% Confidence Interval

24.60

21.44 - 27.98

PANSE-NSE

0-96

78

10.11

8.53 - 11.76

ISEL

6 - 24

78

22.28

21.84 - 22.66

prSFS

1-4

76

3.41

3.33 - 3.49

Measure

Convoy

aBased on

transformed score

Note: Convoy = measure ofsocial network size
PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchanges Measure - Negative Social Exchange subscale
ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form
prSFS = Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale

0
N

Table 10.
Correlations between Social Relations, Health, Demographics, and Depression

Measure
1. Convoy
2. PANSE-NSE
3. ISEL
4. PrSFS
5. Vascular Risk
6. CMI
7. PP Health SelfRating

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

-.02

-.43**

0

-.42**

.18

.11

-.09

-.02

-.30**

.33**

.03

.02

-.16

-.20

-.08

0

.27*

.17

.25*

-.11

-.27*

.06

.09

.38**

.24*

-.16

-.20

.07

-.19

.24*

-.44**

-.43**

-.11

-.17

.21

.22

.11

-.08

-.06

.12

.21

-.48**

-.06

-.04

N

8. PP Age
9. PP Education

.012

10. PPGDS
*p<.05, ** p<.OJ

Note: Convoy = measure of social network size; PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchanges Measure - Negative Social
Exchange subscale; ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form; prSFS = Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale
Vascular Risk = cumulative vascular risk score; CMf = Charlson Comorbidity Index; PP GDS = Primary Participant Geriatric
Depression Scale score

Table 11
Measures of awareness - Means and Standard Deviationsa (or 95% confidence intervals)
~easure

N

~ean

SD a

Discrepancy

95% Confidence
Interval

n (%) under-

n (%) 0

discrepancy
3 (3.9%)

n (%) overestimating
functioning
32 (42.2%)

PrSFS
76
Awareness b

-0.82

a

(-3.37) - (+1.80)

estimating
functioning
41 (53.9%)

~ARS-

76

-1.22

8.09

(-3.07) - (+0.63)

47 (61.8%)

3 (3.9%)

26 (34.3%)

78

-0.23

1.12

(-0.48) - (+0.02)

34 (43.6%)

25 (32.1 %)

19 (24.4%)

HVLT-R
Postdiction

77

-0.01

0.90

(-0.22) - (+0.19)

24 (31.2%)

31 (40.3%)

22 (28.6%)

LN-Seq
Prediction

77

-0.75

0.83

(-0.94) - (-0.56)

49 (63.6%)

25 (32.5%)

3 (3.9%)

LN-Seq
Postdiction

76

-0.71

1.04

(-0.95) - (-0.47)

47 (61.8%)

20 (26.3%)

9 (11.8%)

~FS

Awareness
HVLT-R
Prediction

aNot reported for transformed variables
bBased on transformed score
Note: prSFS Awareness=Discrepancy between primary participant (PP) and informant (IN) ratings of PP social functioning on the
prSFS
MARS-MFS Awareness = Discrepancy between PP and IN ratings of PP memory on the MARS-MFS
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between prediction and actual performance on HVLT-R Trial 1
HVLT-R Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between prediction and actual performance on HVLT-R Total Recall
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between prediction and actual performance on Letter-Number Sequencing subtest
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdiction and actual performance on Letter-Number Sequencing subtest

N
N

.......

Table 12

Correlations between Awareness, Health, Demographics, and depression
2.a
Measure
1.
3.
.28* .06
1. PrSFS Awareness
.03
2. MARS-MFS
Awareness a
3. HVL T -R Prediction
Awareness
4. HVL T -R Postdiction
Awareness
5. LN-Seq Prediction
Awareness
6. LN -Seq Postdiction
Awareness
7. Vascular Risk
8. eMI
9. PP Health SelfRating
10. PPAge
11. PP Education
12. PPGDS
aBased on 76 pairs;
*p<.05, ** p<.Ol;

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12 .

.02

.11

.04

.26*

-.18

-.11

-.04

-.04

.21

-.02

.12

.13

.07

-.12

.04

-.11

.20

.14

.43**

.09

.18

.10

-.16

.07

-.11

.14

-.07

.18

.22

-.23 b

.03

0

.20

-.26*

.21

.65**

.08

.07

0

-.03

0

-.09
M

N

.10

-.13

0

-.19

.11

-.15

-.44**

-.43**

-.11

-.17

.21

.22

.11

-.08

-.06

.12

.21

-.48**

-.06

-.04
.012

bp

= .05

......

Table 13.
Correlations between Performance-Based Measures ofAwareness and Associated Cognitive Variables

Associated
Cognitive
Variable:

HVLT-R Trial! T
score

HVLT-R Total Recall T
score

LN-Sequencing
Total Tscore

Awareness
Variable:
HVLT-R
Prediction
Awareness

-.75**

HVLT-R
Postdiction
Awareness

-.27*

"""

N

LN-Seq
Prediction
Awareness

-.35**

LN-Seq
Postdiction
Awareness

-.31 **

*Significant at p < .05; **Significant at p < .01

Table 14.

Significant Mean Differences between Men and Women on the HVLT-R performance-based Awareness Measures
Variable

Statistic

Mean for Males
(SD)

Mean for Females (SD)

HVL T-R Prediction
Awareness

t(76) = -3.40, P < .01

0.41 (1.01)

-0.49 (1.07)

HVL T-R Postdiction
Awareness

t(75) = -2.72, p < .01

0.41 (0.91)

-0.18 (0.84)

lr)

C"l

Table 15.
Significant Differences between the African-American group and the non-Hispanic White group

t (75) = -3.79, P < .001

African-American mean (SD or
95% CI)
26.71 95% CI [18.15, 33.27]

Non-Hispanic White mean
{SD or 95% CI)
33.61 95% CI [32.83, 34.35]

t (75) = -2.16, P = .03

0.80 (SO = 0.84)

-0.28 (SO = 1.09)

t(75) = 2.11, P < .05

1.80 (SO = 1.30)

2.63 (SO = 0.81)

t (75) = 1.91, P = .06

3.00 (SO = 0.71)

3.90 (SO = 1.04)

t (75) = 1.92, p= .06

99.33 (SO = 9.61)

108. 55 (SO = 10.40)

Variable

Statistic

FP Composite
HVLT-R
Prediction
Awareness
Health (selfrating)
Education
VerbalIQ
(NAART)

\0
C'l

Table 16.

Correlations between ToM and Health Variables, Demographic and Depression
Measure
1. FP Composite
2. EYES
3. Vascular Risk
4. CMI
5. PP Health Self-Rating
6. PP Age
7. PP Education

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

.10

0

.24*

-.15

.05

-.17

.05

.09

0

-.20

.33**

-.19

-.09

-.44**

-.43**

-.11

-.17

.21

.22

.11

-.08

-.06

.12

.21

-.48**

-.06

-.04
.012

8. PP GDS

*p<.05, ** p<.Ol
Note: Vascular Risk = cumulative vascular risk score; CMI = Charlson Comorbidity Index; PP GDS = Primary Participant
Geriatric Depression Scale score

l:N

Table 17

Correlations between ToM and Cognition
Measure
1. FP Composite
2. EYES

3. Visual Acuity
4. NAART

1.

2.
.10

3.
-.03

4.
-.20

5.
-.16

6.
.14

7.
.15

8.
-.19

-.27*

-.42*

-.38**

.23*

.22

-.33**

.27*

.15

-.14

-.05

.15

.51 **

-.28*

-.35**

.583**
00
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5. DRS-2

6. HVL T-R Delayed
Recall
7. FAB

8. LN- Seq

*p<.05, ** p<.Ol

-.40**

-.34**

.39**

.26*

-.35**

-.33**

Table 18
Correlations between Social Relations and Cognition

Measure
1. Convoy

2. PANSE-NSE
3. ISEL
4. prSFS
5. Visual Acuity
6. NAART
7. DRS-2
8. HVL T-R Delayed
Recall
9. FAB

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

-.02

-.43**

0

.13

.17

.28*

-.33**

-.11

.28*

.33**

.03

-.18

-.05

.03

-.08

.12

-.04

.17

-.16

-.08

-.24*

.07

.19

-.22

-.13

-.03

-.07

-.27*

.12

0

.27*

.15

-.14

-.05

.15

.51 **

-.28*

-.35**

.58**

-.40**

-.34**

.39**

.26*

-.35**
-.33**

10. LN-Seq
*p<.05, ** p<.Ol
Note: Convoy = measure of social network size; PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchanges Measure - Negative Social
Exchanges; ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form; prSFS = Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale

0'1
N

Table 19.

Correlations between Awareness and Cognition

Measure
1. prSFS Awareness

1.

2.a

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

.28*

.06

.02

.11

.04

.05

.13

.09

-.19

.07

0

.03

-.02

.12

.13

.05

.17

-.07

-.14

.06

-.02

.429**

.09

.18

.05

-.05

-.23*

.55**

.31 **

-.07

.18

.22

.20

.18

-.01

.18

.12

.19

2. MARS-MFS
Awareness a
3. HVLT-R
Prediction
Awareness
4. HVLT-R
Postdiction
Awareness
5. LN-Seq Prediction
Awareness
6. LN-Seq Postdiction
Awareness
7. Visual Acuity
8. NAART
9. DRS-2
10. HVLT-R Delayed
Recall
11. FAB
12. LN-Seq
*p<.05, ** p<.OJ, aBased on 76 pairs

0

M

.65** .09
.10

-.10

-.07

.11

.10

-.35**

0

.03

.13

.10

-.31 **

.27*

.15

-.14

-.05

.15

-.35**

.58**

-.34**

.39**

.26*

-.35**

.51 ** -.28*
-.40**

-.33**

Table 20.

Significant Mean Differences on Cognition between Impaired and Non-Impaired Groups, as measured by ToM tests

ToM Measure
of Impairment

Variable

Statistic

Mean for Impaired (SD or
95% CI)

Mean for Non-Impaired
(SD or 95% CI)

FP Composite

Estimated Verbal
IQ (NAART)

t(76) = -2.49, p < .05

103.58 (11.09)

109.76 (9.72)

EYES

Estimated Verbal
IQ (NAART)

t(76) = -3.88, P <
.001

95.35 (10.17)

109.31 (9.59)

EYES

Global Cognition
(DRS-2 Scaled
Score)

t(75) = -3.36, p < .01

8.63 (1.85)

11.46 (2.31)
..-

M

EYES

Working
Memory (LNSeq)

t(75) = -2.86, p< .01

47.50 (8.83)

56.97 (8.86)

EYES

Frontal Lobe
Functioning
(FAB Tscore)

t(76) = 2.09, P < .05

51.72 (95% CI[39.47, 60.55])

60.16
(95% CI [57.90, 62.13])

FP
REJECTIONS

Frontal Lobe
Functioning
(FAB Tscore)

t(76)

2.19, P < .05

f
52.41 (95% CI[44.73, 58.56])

=

60.29
(95% CI [57.96, 62.31])

Table 21
Correlations between ToM and Social Relations Variables

Measure
1. FP Composite
2. EYES
3. Convoy
4. PANSE - NSE

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

.10

-.01

.05

-.01

-.08

-.10

.07

.11

0

-.02

-.43**

0

.33**

.03
N

!"")

5. ISEL

.17

6. prSFS

*p<.05, ** p<.OJ
Note: PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchange Measure - Negative Social Exchange subscale;
ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form; prSFS = Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale

Table 22.

Correlations between ToM and Awareness Variables

Measure
1. FP Composite

2. EYES
3. prSFS Awareness

4. MARS-MFS Awarenessa
5. HVL T-R Prediction
Awareness
6. HVL T-R Postdiction
Awareness
7. LN Seq Prediction
Awareness
8. LN Seq Postdiction
Awareness
*p<.05, ** p<.OJ
aBased on 76 pairs

1.

2.

3.

4.a

5.

6.

7.

8.

.10

-.10

-.25*

.08

.13

-.03

-.11

-.14

-.15

.18

-.04

.04

-.05

.28*

.06

.02

.11

.04

.03

-.02

.12

.13

.429**

.09

.18

("f')
("f')

......

.18

.22
.65**

Table 23.

Significant Mean Differences on Awareness Measures between Impaired and Non-Impaired Groups, as measured by ToM tests

ToM Measure

Awareness
Variable

Statistic

Mean for Impaired (SD or
95% CI)

Mean for Non-Impaired
(SD or 95% CI)

MARS-MFS
Awareness

t(74) = -2.18, P < .05

-4.22 (7.54)

0.08 (8.05)

MARS-MFS
FP
REJECTIONS Awareness

t(74) = -3.09, P < .01

-8.20 (8.15)

-0.17 (7.60)

HVLT-R
FP
REJECTIONS Postdiction
Awareness

t(75) = 1.98, P = .052

0.50 (0.71)

-.09 (0.90)

of Impairment
FP Composite

a

'<t

M

EYES

prSFS Awareness

t(74) = -1.86, P = .068

a

-7.24 (95% CI[-15.98,
5.09])b

-0.06
(95% CI[ -2.57, 2.70])b

-0.25 (0.89)
-0.81 (0.81)
t(75) = 1.84, P = .07a
LN-Seq
Prediction
Awareness
aapproached significance
b transformed scores were converted back to raw scores for reporting of means and 95% confidence intervals

EYES

Table 24
Reference Table for significant relationships between ToM variables and selected study variables across analyses methods
General
Construct

Study Variable

EYES

EYES
Impairment

Demographics

A2e
Gender
Education
Ethnicity
CMI
Vascular Risk
Self-Rated Health
PD screener
GDS
NAART
DRS-2
HVL T -R Delayed Recall
FAB
LN-Seq
Convoy
ISEL
PANSE-NSE
IprSFS
MARS-MFS Awareness
IprSFS Awareness
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness
HVLT-R Postdiction Awareness
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness

**

x

Health

Depression
Cognition

Social Relations

Awareness

Faux Pas
Composite

Faux Pas
Composite
Impairment

Faux Pas
REJECTION
S Impairment

**
*

*

x

x

**
**
*
x
**

**
**

*

<r)

M

*
**

*

*

*

**

x
x
x

*"

Note: x = approached significance, * = significant at p < .05, ** = significant at P < .01,
"only significant when minority participants removed from analysis

Figure 1.

Model of relationship between ToM and social variables

prSFS

PANSE-NSE

Convoy

ISEL

Note: EYES = Reading the EYES in the Mind - Revised score
FP Composite Score = Faux Pas Composite score
prSFS = Peer Report Social Functioning Scale
PANSE-NSE = Positive and Negative Social Exchange measure - Negative Social
Exchange subscale
Convoy = Convoy Measure for social network size
ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form
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Figure 2.

Model of hypotheses related to ToM and awareness

EYES

prSFS Avvare _

FP Composite

LN-Seq Post. A w are .

Note: EYES = Reading the EYES in the Mind - Revised score
FP Composite Score = Faux Pas Composite score
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and
actual performance on the Letter-Number Sequencing subtest
HVLT-R Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and actual
performance on HVLT-R.
MARS-MFS Awareness= Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant
ratings ofprimary participant memory on MARS-MFS
prSFS Awareness = Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant
ratings ofprimary participant social functioning on prSFS.
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and
actual performance on Letter-Number Sequencing
HVLT-R Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and
actual performance on HVLT-R.
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Figure 3.

Model of ToM and Social Relations a

.01

PANSE-NSE

. 15

Convoy

.02

ISEL

aBased on 75 participants and their informants
Note: EYES = Reading the Eyes in the Mind Test
Faux Pas = Faux Pas Test
prSFS = Peer-Report Social Functioning Scale (prSFS) Informant report
PANSE-NSE = Negative Social Exchanges as measured by the Positive and
Negative Social Exchange (PANSE) measure;
Convoy = measure of social network size
ISEL = Interpersonal Support Evaluation List - Short Form (ISEL)
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Figure 4.
Model a/ToM and Awareness

a

. 01

LN-Seq Pred. A vvare .
.0 4

HVLT-R Prad o Avvara .

MARS-M FS Avvara . ~f---(83)

14

prSFS A vvare .

aBased on 72 participants and their informants
Note: EYES = Reading the EYES in the Mind - Revised score
FP Composite Score = Faux Pas Composite score
LN-Seq Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and
actual performance on the Letter-Number Sequencing subtest
HVL T -R Prediction Awareness = Discrepancy between predicted performance and actual
performance on HVLT -R.
MARS-MFS Awareness= Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant
ratings of primary participant memory on MARS-MFS
prSFS Awareness = Discrepancy score between informant and primary participant
ratings of primary participant social functioning on prSFS.
LN-Seq Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and
actual performance on Letter-Number Sequencing
HVL T -R Postdiction Awareness = Discrepancy between postdicted performance and
actual performance on HVLT-R.
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